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VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6.3 The right to conflict-free representation “extends to any situation in which a defendant’s counsel owes conflicting duties to that defendant and some other third person.” (quotation omitted).

(concluding that counsel’s advice about what defendant should discuss at trial was reasonable trial strategy).

“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, [appellate courts] view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence.”

Th e reviewing court must “assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence.”

The supreme court noted that counsel’s “decision was reasonable in order to avoid creating sympathy for [the victim] and hostility toward [defendant] or his attorney.” Id.; (concluding that defense counsel’s decision not to cross-examine several state witnesses was a reasonable trial tactic).

We “assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence.”

Appellate courts must “assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence.” 2 (Minn. 1998).

( (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under this standard of review, appellate courts must “assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence.”

We “assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence.”

In caselaw reviewing trial counsel’s performance for ineffective assistance, the supreme court has stated that “counsel must have the discretion and flexibility to devise a trial strategy that best serves the client.”

at we generally do not review include “[t]he extent of counsel’s investigation,” id., counsel’s decisions regarding what evidence to present, (“What evidence to present and which witnesses to call at trial are tactical decisions properly left to the discretion of trial counsel”), and counsel’s advice to the client, e.g., State v. Brocks, 8 (concluding that counsel’s advice about what the defendant should discuss at trial was reasonable trial strategy).

represent[s] an atto rney’s decision regarding trial tactics which lie within the proper discretion of trial c ounsel and will not be reviewed later for competence.”), and counsel’s advice to the client, (concluding that counsel’s advice about what the defendant should discuss at trial was reasonable trial strategy).

We “assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence.”

We “assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence.” State v. Brocks

We “assume that the [fact -finder] believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence.” State v. Brocks

We “assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence.”

We “assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence.” State v. Brocks

11 We “assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence.”

The appellate court must a ssume that the fact -finder “believed the state ’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence.”

Under this standard, we assume that the jury or the fact-finder “believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence.”

The appellate court assumes that the fact -finder “believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved c ontrary evidence.” State v. Brocks

Under this standard, the jury is said to have “believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any contrary evidence.”

When applying that standard, this court assumes that the jury “disbelieved any evidence that conflicted with the verdict.” State v. Griffin , State v. Brocks , (statin g that appellate courts “assume that the jury 5 believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence ”).

The appellate court “assume[s] that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence.”

We “assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence.”