Cited by

at 222 ( (Meyer, J., concurring) (“Although we eventually abandoned the special jury instruction, we retained the traditional rational hypothesis review standard.”); State v. Jones , n.4 (Minn. 1994) (holding that Turnipseed controlled and that the district court did not err in failing to give a rational-hypothesis jury instruction on circumstantial evidence)).

n.1 (Minn. 1994) (concluding that an appeal was not moot because the appellant “now has a criminal history which could have an impact on sentencing should he be convicted of a crime in the future”).

Peterson cites three circumstantial-evidence cases to support his argument for reversal based on either of his alternative hypotheses:

at 331 (“Due to the seriousness of the potential consequences created by the early intervention provisions, we conclude that collateral consequences attach to appellant’s [civil] commitment.”); n.1 (Minn. 1994) (concluding that a criminal defendant’s appeal was not moot even though he had 9 been released from prison because his criminal conviction could carry potential consequences, such as negatively impacting his ability to obtain future employment).

n.5 (Minn. 1994) (explaining that even though neither party sought review of an issue, “[i]n exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, appellate courts, in the public interest, may, of their own motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they oth

“[A] conviction based on circumstantial evidence may stand only where the facts and circumstances disclosed by the circumstantial evidence form a complete chain which, in light of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the accused as to exclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, any reasonable inference other than that of guilt.” (quotation omitted).

A conviction based on circumstantial evidence may stand “only where the facts and circumstances disclosed by the circumstantial evidence form a complete chain which, in light of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the accused as to exclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, a ny reasonable inference other than that of guilt.” , 549 (Minn. 1994) (quotation omitted).

“[A] conviction based on circumstantial evidence may stand only where the facts and circumstances disclose d by the circumstan tial evidence form a complete chain which, in light of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the accused as to exclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, any reasonable inference other than that of guilt.” (quotation omitted).

8 “[A] conviction based entirely on circumst antial evidence merits stricter scrutiny than convictions based in part on direct evidence.”

“[A] conviction based entirely o n 13 circumstantial evidence merits stricter scrutiny than convictions based in part on direct evidence.”

“[A] conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence merits stricter scrutiny than convictions based in part on direct evidence.”

“[A] conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence merits stricter scrutiny than convictions based in part on direct evidence.”

“[A] conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence merits stricter scrutiny 4 than convictions based in part on direct evidence.”

“ [A] conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence merits stricter scrutiny than convictions based in part on direct evidence.”

“[A] conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence merits stricter scrutiny than convictions based in part on direct evidence.”

When the state proves an element of a charge with only circumstantial evidence, it “merits stricter scrutiny than convictions based in part on direct evidence.”

“[A] conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence merits stricter scrutiny than convictions based in part on direct evidence.”

App. P. 103.04; n.5 (Minn. 1994) (quotation omitted)

“[A] conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence merits stricter scrutiny than convictions based in part on direct evidence.”

interfere with later opportunities for higher education and employment”); -47 n.1 (Minn. 1994) (concluding, without reference to evidence in record, that appeal of criminal defendant was not moot in part because “having a criminal record could affect his ability to obtain future employment”).

See, (“Although we eventually abandoned the special jury instruction, we retained the traditional rational hypothesis review standard.”) (Meyer, J., concurring); n.4 (Minn. 1994) (holding that Turnipseed controlled and that the district court did not err in failing to give a rational hypothesis jury instruction regarding circumstantial evidence).

“[A] conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence merits stricter scrutiny than convictions based in part on direct evidence.”

“[A] conviction based on circumstantial evidence may stand only where the facts and circumstances disclosed by the circumstantial evidence form a complete chain which, in light of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the accused as to exclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, any reasonable inference other than that of guilt.” (quotation omitted).

Although circumstantial evidence merits the same weight as direct evidence, we scrutinize more strictly convictions that depend on circumstantial evidence

Although circumstantial evidence merits the same weight as direct evidence, we must apply a stricter degree of scrutiny on review of convictions that depend on circumstantial evidence

the court explained that heightened scrutiny “controls only when every element required for conviction has been proved entirely by circumstantial evidence.” Al-Naseer V, 2009 WL 304738 , at *4.

-88 (Minn.2006), we affirmed a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, restating the analytical framework of Webb, d at 430-31 , -49 (Minn.1994).