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A direct consequence is one that flows “definitely, immediately, and automatically from the guilty plea—the maximum sentence and any fine to be imposed.”

Hoflock contends that the supreme court’s d 573 (Minn. 1998), requires us to allow him to withdraw his pleas.

10 ( abrogated in part by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) ); see also Campos v. State

Direct cons equences are those “which flow definitely, immediately, and automatically from the guilty plea—the maximum sentence and any fine to be imposed.”

Because the state accepts this premise and because we are limited to the arguments as they are presented to us, for purposes of our review in this case, -79 (Minn. 1998), that held th at ignorance of deportation consequences does not entitle a criminal defendant to withdraw a guilty plea.

As a result, and as part of the PSI, the Minnesota probation agent contacted a California probation agent who would be supervising appellant and who recommended many of the “special conditions.” 4 definitely, immediately, and automatically from the guilty plea—the maximum sentence and any fine to be imposed.” -42 (Minn. App. 20 13) (holding direct consequences “are those which flow definitely, immediately, and automatically from the guilty plea, such as the maximum sentence to be imposed and the

11 “[D]irect consequences are those which flow definitely, immediately, and automatically from the guilty plea.” Alanis v. State

Direct consequences “are those which flow definitely, immediately, and automatically from the 5 guilty plea—the maximum sentence and any fine to be imposed.” , abrogated in part by Padilla v. Kentucky , 559 U.S. 356, 374, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010); -42 (Minn. App. 2013) (holding direct consequences “are those which flow definitely, immediately, and automatically from the guilty plea, such as the maximum sen

d 573, 578 (Minn. 1998).

(footnot es omitted), overruled in part on other grounds by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010)

Direct consequences are those punitive consequences that are “definite, immediate, or automatic.” see Kaiser, d at 904 (clarifying Alanis’s definition to exclude nonpunitive consequences).

At the time of Barragan and Levkovich , had held that an attorney has no duty to advise a client about the possibility of deportation as a result of pleading guilty because deportation was a collateral consequence.

-79 (Minn.1998) (holding that defense counsel was not required to inform a non-citizen defendant that his plea would lead to deportation because the immigration consequences did not “flow definitely, immediately, and automatically from the guilty plea”)

We held in Alanis v. State that “it is the direct consequences of the guilty plea to which we refer.” (emphasis added), abrogated in part by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010); -88 (Minn. 2012).

To support this contention, neither of which support appellant’s position.2 Hirt involved a defendant who pleaded guilty and then sought postconviction relief alleging that his plea was not freely and voluntarily made.

Following Padilla, Minnesota courts have made a distinction between collateral and direct consequences of a plea in determining the reasonableness of an attorney’s performance, and have held that attorneys must advise their clients of only direct consequences of a plea, such as “the maximum sentence to be imposed and the amount of any fine,” abrogated in part by Padilla, 559 U.S. at 388, 130 S. Ct. at 1494.

abrogated in part by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).

“[D]irect consequences are those which flow definitely, immediately, and automatically from the guilty plea,” such as *842 “the maximum sentence to be imposed and the amount of any fíne.” abrogated in part by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 , 130 S.Ct.

The court determined that Padilla did not apply retroactively, but had instead announced “a new constitutional rule because it impose[d] a new requirement on counsel under the federal constitution.” The court relied on an earlier decision from our court, abrogated in part by Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct.

was not intelligent, and then rejected the appellant’s ineffectiveness argument on essentially the same grounds: “because as a collateral consequence of the guilty plea, his attorney was under no obligation to advise him of the deportation possibility ..., the failure to so inform him could not have fallen below an objective standard of reasonableness as required by Strickland.” -79 (Minn.1998); -64 (Minn.1998) (following Alanis).