Cited by

(stating that “sentencing is not a proper consideration for the jury”).

Assuming, as we must, 9 that the jury believed the officer’s testimony, , the jury could reasonably have concluded that Kaska was impaired by controlled substances, - 91 (Minn. App. 1986) (holding there was sufficient evidence to sustain DWI conviction where jury “evidently believed the testimony of the state’s witnesses and dis

verdict and assume[s] that the [fact-finder] believed all of the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

(discussing sufficiency-of-the-evidence review after jury trial on substantive offense).

The State does not challenge that the requested offenses were lesser-included offenses, and as we have explained, “[e]very lesser degree of homicide or murder is a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder.” 26 (Minn. 1999) (concluding second-degree manslaughter and criminal vehicular homicide were lesser-included offenses of first-degree murder).

When defense counsel stated that he intended to cross-examine the police investigators about a photograph of C.J. that 1 (explaining that “sentencing is not a proper consideration for the jury”).

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) .

at 470; see also State v. Chambers

2 We review factual findings for clear error and determine whether the findings are based on evidence in the record, which we view in the light most favorable to the verdict.

(“Where evidence sought to be introduced under Spreigl does not tend to show that the defendant is guilty of a crime other than the crime with which he is charged, the chance of it creating unfair prejudice is less than is ordinarily the case when evidence is admitted under Rule 404(b).” (quotati

State v. Chambers , , 477 (Minn. 1999).

evidence improperly elicited was particularly damaging.” The supreme court has said that, if prior -bad-act evidence “did not tend to show that [the] defendant was guilty of another crime, the chance of it creating unfair prejudice was less than is ordinarily the case when evidence is admitted under Rule 404(b).” State v. Kutchara , see State v. Chambers , (stating the same).

State v. Finley , 214 Minn. 228 , , 218 (1943) ; see State v. Chambers , , 474 (Minn. 1999).

We assume “that the [fact-finder] believed all of the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State v. Chambers

We assume “that the jury believed all of the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

We “assume that the [fact- finder] believed all of the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” (noting that the same standard applies to court trials).

(“The decision to grant or deny a motion for a change of venue is within the wide discretion of the trial court.”).

We assume “that the jury believed all of the state’s 3 witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” d 466, 477 (Minn. 1999).

We assume “that the jury believed all of the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” d 466, 477 (Minn. 1999).

5 We assume “that the jury believed all of the state's witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

We “assume that the [fact-finder] believed all of the state's witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

We “assume that the [fact-finder] believed all of the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

We assume “that the jury believed all of the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

We must assume “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

We assume “that the jury believed all of the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.”

of showing that our culture and laws emphatically and well nigh universally reject the sentence.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).