Cited by

at 263, 269 (considering whether defendant’s counsel had “ample time” to acquire and review the evidence); (affirming the denial of a continuance because receiving a report 13 days before the start of trial provided sufficient time to address the asserted problem); (considering the length of time between the indictment and trial and the proximity of the continuance motion to the start of trial); Turnipseed, d at 311-12 (concluding no abuse of discretion occurred in denying a continuance because

We therefore consider “the circumstances before the trial court when the motion was made to determine whether the defendant was so prejudiced in preparing or presenting his defense as to materially affect the outcome of the trial.”

at 269 (considering whether defendant’s counsel had “ample time” to acquire and review the evidence); (affirming the denial of a continuance because receiving a report 13 days before the start of trial provided sufficient time to address the asserted problem); (considering the length of time between the indictment and trial and the proximity of the continuance motion to the start of trial); Turnipseed, d at 311-12 (concluding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying a continuance because

See State v. Lloyd , (“The resolution of conflicting testimony is the exclusive function of the [fact-finder] because it has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and weigh their credibility.”); State v. Washington , (“The weight and 2 We note that appellant’s behavior

“The decision to grant or deny a continuance lies within the discretion of the trial judge.”

But the inconsistencies in this case do not justify a departure from the well-established rule tha t “ [t]he resolution of conflicting testimony is the exclusive function of the jury because it has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and weigh their credibility.”

But if “the single witness’ identification of a defendant is made after only fleeting or limited observation, corroboration is required if the conviction is to be sustained.” -45 (Minn. 1984)

(concluding that district court properly denied request when defendan t explained that u nnamed witnesses might be willing to testify but provided no information about th eir testimony or assuran ces that they would testify); (concluding that d

In addition, appellate courts look to “the circumstances surrounding the requested continuance and whether the denial was so prejudicial in the preparation of an adequate defense as to ‘materially affect the outcome of the trial.’” (quoting State v. Lloyd , ); see also State v. King , (observing that appel late courts evaluate whether denial would prejudice the defendant ).

24 district court’s discretion); (upholding a decision to admit a second-degree murder conviction for impeachment in trial for first-degree murder had defendant testified).

An appellate court “will not reverse a district court’s rulin g on the impeachment of a witness by prior conviction absent a clear abuse of discretion.” (“We must uphold the trial court’s ruling [on impeachment evidence under Rule 609] unle ss a clear abuse of discretion is shown.” (quotatio n omitted)).

State v. Lloyd , , 247 (Minn. 1984).

(noting that jury has opportunity to observe demeanor of witnesses and weigh their credibility).

o admit all seven prior convictions, contending th at “one prior, or, at most two or three would have been more than sufficient.” Impeachment by prior felonies is intended to “allow[] the factfinder ‘to judge better the credibility of a witness by affording it the opportunity to view that person as a whole.’” State v. Hofmann , (quoting State v. Lloyd , ).

Moreover, “[t]he resolution of conflicting testimony is the exclusive function of the [factfinder.]” State v. Lloyd

(stating that “[w]ith respect to identifying defendant as [the victim]’s mu rderer, the stat e’s evidence essentially rested on the eyewitness identification of a single witness,” acknowledging that the witness observed the murderer for as little as one minute from “approximately 85 feet away” at

Such a limiting instruction “adequately protects [a] defendant against the possibility that the jury would convict him on the basis of his character rather than his guilt.”

“Even inconsistencies in the state’s case will not require a reversal of the jury verdict,” id., d at 584, because “the resolution of conflicting testimony is the exclusive function of the jury.”

To lessen the highly prejudicial effect of impeaching with convictions that are the same as or similar to the present charge, the district court may require the state to impeach with “an unspecified felony conviction,” Hill, d at 652-53, or read a cautionary instruction “directing the jury to consider the prior conviction[s] only for impeachment purposes,”

d 240, 247 (Minn. 1984).

(stating that allowing prior convictions to come in under the Jones factors did not prevent the jury from hearing a defendant’s version of events because a police officer told the jury what the defendant’s version was).

The “resolution of conflicting testimony is the exclusive function of the jury[, which] has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and weigh their credibility.”

The “resolution of conflicting testimony is the exclusive function of the jury[, which] has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and weigh their credibility.”

See, -67 (Minn.1993); -47 (Minn.1984).

“The decision to grant a continuance is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court.” ().

“The decision to grant or deny a continuance lies within the discretion of the trial judge.”

“The decision to grant or deny a continuance lies within the discretion of the [district] court.”