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The state notes that “a prosecutor has broad discretion in the exercise of the charging function and ordinarily, under the separation-of-powers doctrine, a court should not interfere with the prosecutor’s exercise of that discretion.”

We recognize that “[g]enerally, a prosecutor has broad discretion in the exercise of the charging function and ordinarily, under the separation -of-powers doctrine, a court should not interfere with the prosecutor ’s exercise of that discretion.”8 .

“Generally, a prosecutor has broad discretion in the exercise of the charging function and ordinarily, under the separation-of-powers doctrine, a court should not interfere with the prosecutor’s exercise of that discretion.”

Appellant argues he was wrongly charged with possession of a firearm because his “DNA fingerprint[s]” were not on it and this false accusation prejudiced his “DWI trial.” However, there is no DNA or finger print requirement to charge appellant and “a prosecutor has broad discretion in the exercise of 6 the charging function.” State v. Foss , , 540 (Minn. 1996).

D E C I S I O N “Generally, a prosecutor has broad discretion in the exercise of the charging function and ordinarily, under the separation-of -powers doctrine, a court should not interfere with the prosecutor’s exercise of that discretion.” 540 (Minn. 1996); see also Minn. Const. art. III, § 1 (stating that “[n]o person or persons belonging to or constituting one of [the three departments of government] shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others except” when exp

( (order), in parenthetical).

d 540, 540 (Minn. 1996).

general rule, the prosecutor’s decision whom to prosecute and what charge to file is a discretionary matter which is not subject to judicial review absent proof by defendant of deliberate discrimination based on some unjustifiable standard such as race, sex, or religion.”

The supreme court has stated that a district court’s authority to order a stay of adjudication should be “relied upon sparingly.”

a young first offender and the other older, with a criminal record, or one played a lesser and the other a dominant role, one the instigator and the other a follower, the prosecutor can and should take such factors into account....” State v. Anderson, 280 Minn. 461, 464-65 , (quoting Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 481-82 (D.C.Cir.1967)); (order) (“Generally, a prosecutor has broad discretion in the exercise of the charging function and ordinarily, under the separation-of-powers doctrine,

The supreme court has also observed that “it is standard practice among judges to order defendants to serve a jail term of less than one year as a ‘condition’ of their probationary term under section 152.18.” (stating that with a stay of adjudication, “the district court has the power to impose terms and conditions of probation, including incarceration for up to 12 months” (quotation omitted)); Ender, d at 40 (addressing stay of adjudicati

review denied (Minn. Oct.

Six months after Krotzer , we held in State v. Foss that a stay of adjudication may be ordered “only for the purpose of avoiding an injustice resulting from the prosecutor’s clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of the charging function.”

The Tho-ma court noted that the supreme court had previously granted further review of a pair of non-felony stays of adjudication:

Prosecutors have broad discretion regarding the charging function and “ordinarily, under the separation-of-powers doctrine, a court should not interfere with the * * * exercise of that discretion.”

(stating that the inherent judicial authority to stay adjudication should be exercised sparingly and in “special circumstances”); -55 (Minn.1996) (district court's decision to stay adjudication over prosecutor's objection did not violate separation-of-powers princi

allow a district court to stay adjudication only if special circumstances exist, the court of appeals concluded that no special circumstances were present in this case and reversed and remanded for adjudication and sentencing.