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A party may introduce “extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement” to impeach a declarant-witness if (1) the party “submit[s] a foundation that the statements are actually inconsistent, or that the [declarant-witness] fails to recollect the prior statement,” (quotations and citation omitted), and (2) “the [declarant-witness] is afforded a prior opportunity to explain or deny the [statement] and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the [declarant- witness] thereo

Appellate courts “review a district court’s evidentiary determinations for an abuse of discretion.” (reviewing the appellant’s argument that extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement was admissible under rule 613(b) for an abuse of discretion, notwithstanding that the argument was not presented to the district court).

The district court, “in 7 its discretion, determines whether the declarant was under the aura of excitement, and we review the determination for an abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted); (deferring to the district court’s determination that the declarant was under a sufficient aura of excitement).

A defendant is entitled to a Schwartz hearing when they present a prima facie case that, “standing alone and unchallenged, would warrant the conclusion of jury misconduct.” -26 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).

(stating rule 613(b) requires party to lay foundation that 6 The state seems to agree, in part, that the district court applied the incorrect rule in explaining its ruling.

-27 (Minn. 2000) (affirming the denial of a defendant’s motion for a Schwartz hearing where the proffered evidence required inadmissible testimony about jurors’ thought process during deliberations).

at 438; (concluding that the district court acted within its discretion by determining that a statement did not qualify as an excited utterance when the statement was given “many hours after the startling event” and there was no evidence of excitement).

To be entitled to challenge a verdict through a Schwartz hearing, a defendant must present a prima facie case that “standing alone and unchallenged, would warrant the conclusion of jury misconduct.” -26 (Minn. 2000) (quotations omitted).

The district court, “in its discretion, determines whether the declarant was under the aura of excitement, and we review the determination for an abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted).

According 16 For example, we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded additional impeachment testimony when the defendant presented extrinsic evidence of a phone call that impeached the witness in question.

A defendant is entitled to a Schwartz hearing when they present a prima facie case that “standing alone and unchallenged, would warrant the conclusion of jury misconduct.” -26 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted); see Minn. R. Crim.

A defendant is entitled to a Schwartz hearing when they present a prima facie case that, “standing alone and unchallenged, would warrant the conclusion of jury misconduct.” -26 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).

A defendant is entitled to a Schwartz hearing when they present a prima facie case that, “standing alone and unchallenged, would warrant the conclusion of jury misconduct.” -26 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).

“A family member’s involvement with a criminal investigation is a race-neutral reason for striking a juror.”

d 214, 225-26 (Minn. 2000); Larson, d at 484.

d 214, 224 (Minn. 2000).

613; Doe 136 v. Liebsch, d 875, 882 (Minn. 2015) .

The district court, “ in its discretion, determines whether the declarant was under the ‘aura of excitement,’ and we review that determination for an abuse of discretion.” (quoting Minn. R. Evid.

State v. Martin (Martin I)

(“A family member’s involvement with a criminal investigation is a race-neutral reason for striking a juror.”); see also Adams, d at 330 (conc luding that a juror’s misrepresentations about her criminal histor y is a legitimate race-neutral reason for a strike).

y under this statute, it must find t hat the “act took place on or about July 21, 2016 in Hennepin County, Minnesota.” Although the district court did not explain to the jury what “on or about” meant, the district court informed the jury that “ [i]f an attorney’s argument contains any statement of the law that differs from the law I give you, disregard the statement .” (“We presume that jurors follow the trial court’s instructions.”).

The witness “must also be given the opportunity to ‘admit, deny, or explain the inconsistency in order for the statement to be admissible to impeach the witness.’” (quoting State v. Martin , ); see also Carroll v. Pratt , 5 (holding that “it is usually necessary to lay a proper foundation first on the cross-examination of the witness to be impeached by asking him [or her] whether he [or she] made the alleged inconsistent statement, giving its substanc

d 214, 224 (Minn. 2000) (describing the foundation that must be l aid to impeach a witness by prior inconsistent statement).

“There are no strict temporal guidelines for admitting an excited utterance.” -24 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).

was still under the “aura of excitement.” We observe that “there are no strict temporal guidelines for admitting an excited utterance.” -24 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).

Appellant’s view that he was entitled to a Schwartz hearing because the jury’s decision was controlled by sympathy for the victim, not by the evidence , was rejected in 6 State v. Martin , .

But our caselaw is clear that “ [t]here are no strict temporal guidelines for admitting an excited utterance.” State v. Martin , –24 (Minn. 2000) (quotation 14 omitted).

While appellant argues that cautionary instructions do not eliminate the prejudicial effect of improper statements, “[w]e presume that jurors follow the trial court’s instructions.”

The court also instructed the jury, “If an attorney’s argument contains any statement of the law that differs from the law I give you, disregard the statement.” This court “presume[s] that jurors follow the [district] court’s instructions.”

person would have made in light of the danger perceived and existence of any alternative way of avoiding the p eril.” The district co urt also instructed the jury, “If an attorney’s argument contains any statement of the law that differs from the law that I give you, you should disregard that statement.” We “presume that jurors follow the [district] court’s instructions.”

-24 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).