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appellant contends that this court should review his serialized-prosecution argument de novo; the state appears to agree with appellant’s suggested standard of review.

V; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7; d 515, 520 (Minn. 2013)

U.S. Const. amend V; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7

This statute “protects criminal defendants from both multiple prosecutions and multiple sentences for offenses resulting from the same behavioral incident.”

State v. Schmidt , 10 (Minn. 2000).

Under the second factor, we will uphold “the imposition of one sentence per victim if this would not result in punishment grossly out of proportion to the defendant’s culpability.” (quotation omitted).

We remand to the district court to set aside the jury’s three guilty verdicts for stalking by telephone, dismiss those particular charges, and correct the warrant of commitment.1 877 (Minn. 2000).

2 (where trial court has set aside guilty verdicts before sentencing b ecause a subdivision of the charging statute was declared unconstitutional, retrial under an amended complaint is not prohibited under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the state and federal constitutions).

This statute “protects criminal defendants from both multiple prosecutions and multiple sentences for offenses resulting from the same behavioral incident.”

“ [W]here multiple offenses arise from a single behavioral incident, a conviction or acquittal for one offense bars prosecution for any additional offense.” State v. Schmidt

Griffin v. State , , 285 n.1 (Minn. 2016) (quoting State v. Schmidt , , 876 (Minn. 2000) ) (brackets in original); State v. Johnson , 273 Minn. 394 , , 521-22 (1966).

See, e.g., Jones, d at 533 (finding single course of conduct because defendant sent 33 text messages to victim within two and a half hours, while the victim was at work, and with “a singular intent to intimidate and harass” the victim); (finding single behavioral incident because conduct occurring on the street in front of victims’ home over the course of a year was directed toward a single criminal objective of harassing the victims and criminal complaint used identical facts for multiple count

1 (stating that retrial is appropriate unless a conviction is overturned on appeal on the basis of insufficient evidence, and that prosecuting the defendant under an amended complaint does not violate double jeopardy).

Second, Griffin asserts violations of Minn. Stat. § 609.035 (2014) and the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions,1 which protect defendants from multiple prosecutions or multiple sentences for the same offense

This rule does not “immunize” a defendant from “the consequences of separate crimes intentionally committed in a single episode against more than one individual,” or where multiple sentences do not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct

(indicating that a pattern of harassment beginning in the summer of 1996 and ending in June of 1997 was deemed a single time period), -89 (Minn. App. 2001) (concluding that there was no unity of time when the conduct was broken and sporadic over a peri

Our analysis in Spaulding effectively interpreted the word “conviction” in section 609.035 as requiring a “final conviction.” Twenty years later, we reaffirmed that section 609.035 required a “final conviction.” Castillo-Alvarez urges us to reject the analysis in Spaulding and Schmidt because we cannot add words to the statute, including words requiring that the conviction be final.

In Minnesota, a conviction “requires that a district court both accept and record the guilty plea.” -77 (Minn.2000).