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Vouching is improper because “the credibility of a witness is for the jury to decide, not [another] witness.”

(stating that vouching generally occurs when one witness makes an explicit statement about credibility of another witness).

In State v. Koskela, for example, the supreme court stated the probative value was “questionable,” but it was not impermissible vouching, when a police officer testified that he “had no doubt whatsoever that [he] was taking a truthful statement.”

Koskela, (police officer’s testimony that he “had no doubt” a witness was truthful raised concerns of vouching); -551 (Minn. 1996) (police officer testimony that victim told him that defendant’s wife believed the victim’s story constituted vouching).

See, (stating that a police officer’s testimony that he had “no doubt” that a witness made a truthful statement raised concerns about vouching); (holding that district court erroneously admitted police officer’s opinion testimony that defendant lied wh

Ferguson, d at 835; (concluding it was improper to admit a police officer’s testimony that he was certain he was taking a truthful statement, but also finding no prejudice because other evidence revealed the opi nion on truthfulness was little more than corroborative ); (Minn. 198

(recognizing that credibility of witnesses is for the jury to determine, not another witness).

(quotation omitted); see, (noting the supreme court’s concern about a police officer’s testimony, regarding a defendant’s confession, that the officer “had no doubt whatsoever that [he] was taking a truthful statement”).

Accordingly, the supreme court expressed concern about a police officer’s testimony that the defendant was telling the truth when he confessed to the alleged crime.

And in State v. Koskela, we affirmed a burglary conviction because the State produced independent evidence to corroborate the defendant’s confession, including witness testimony and other “circumstances surrounding the offense.” see also McLarne, 150 N.W.

the district court erred by admitting a police officer’s testimony that the defendant was telling the truth when he confessed to the alleged crime.

State v. Koskela , d 625, 630 (Minn. 1995).

d 625, 630 (Minn. 1995).

One witness cannot vouch for the credib ility of another witness because “the credibility of a witness is fo r the jury to decide.” State v. Ferguson , (quoting State v. Koskela , ).

See, e.g., State v. 6 Ellert, (holding that officer’s testimony that he believed defendant lied in statement to him was improper); d 625, 630 (Minn. 1995) (recognizing that officer’s testimony that confession appeared “truthful” was problematic).

d 625, 630 (Minn. 1995).

Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3) (2014)

18, 2014); (stating that, under burglary statute, “appellant entered the victim’s dwelling by leaping onto the victim’s balcony” and then entering her apartment); (concluding that burglary committed when defendant walked through part of store open to p

The court of appeals justified its limited definition of “confession” and State v. Hauk, 257 Wis.2d 579

403, 702; Reese, d at 740 ; -30 (Minn.1995).

the supreme court used post-crime incriminating statements the defendant made to acquaintances prior to a criminal investigation to corroborate his subsequent confession to police.

The admissibility of expert testimony “generally rests within the sound discretion of the district court and will not be reversed unless there is clear error.”

Therefore, regardless of whether expert testimony embraces an ultimate issue, “[t]he ‘ultimate question of admissibility’ for expert testimony is whether the expert’s testimony will help the trier of fact in evaluating evidence or resolving factual issues.” ().

(an expert may not testify as to the coercive effects of an interrogation on a particular defendant because that is a jury question); -30 (Minn. 1995) (an expert may describe the nature of schizoid-personality disorder in general, but whether the defendant fit the profile was a jury question); -32 (Minn.1982) (an expert opinion about a witness’s capacity to perceive events invades the province of the jury to