Cited by

“If statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the court must give it its plain meaning.”

We must “closely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether it was clear and convincing.”

overruled in part on other grounds by -24 (Minn. 1998)

“The termination statute contains no provision requiring a juvenile court to assess the likelihood that a child will be adopted as part of its analysis of the child’s best interests.” WL 4181639, at *8-9 (Minn. App. Oct.

(discussing relationship between adoptability and TPR), the impo rtance of a stable and safe environment was a strong factor for the district court to consider in this matter.

However, we also “closely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether it was clear and convincing.” see also In re 8 Welfare of S.Z., (stating that appellate courts “exercise[] great caution in termination proceedings, finding such action proper only when the evidence clearly mandates such a result”).

In doing so, we “closely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether it was clear and convincing .”

We acknowledge that the TPR statute “does not require assessment of a child’s adoptability.”

While we will “closely inquire” into the sufficiency of the evidence, we also defer to the district court, which “is in a superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses.”

“The object of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.”

-75 (Minn. App. 1996), overruled in part on other grounds by -24 (Minn. 1998).

(citations and quotations omitted); -61 (Minn. 2008); d at 385; d at 901.

“Considerable deference is due to the district court’s decision because a district court is in a superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses.” In re Welfare of J.M., 14

(citing the predecessor to Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd.

(stating that questions of law in a TPR case are reviewed de novo).

If statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the court must give it its plain meaning.” (quotation o mitted).

This court “will closely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether it was clear and convincing.”

724 (Minn. 1998) (holding that a district court is not required to make findings regarding the adoptability of a child as part of its analysis of 6 whether termination is in the child’s best interests); J.K.T., d at 86 (stating that it “would exceed th

18, 1987); –24 (Minn. 1998) (holding that district court, in determining child’s best interests, did not err by failing to make findings on consideration not included as factor in different best interests statute).

This court gives deference to a trial court's decision to terminate parental rights but “closely inquire[s] into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether it was clear and convincing.”

overruled in part on other grounds by –24 (Minn. 1998).

overruled in part on other grounds by -24 (Minn. 1998).

1(a), (b) (2012) (directing that the court “shall” order guardianship); d 717, 724 (Minn. 1998) (holding that the “termination statute does not require assessment of a child’s adoptability as part of the analysis of the child’s best interests”); (“[N]owhere in the statute is imminent adoption an element of a termination proceeding.”).

We must “closely inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether it was clear and convincing.”

1 (2010) (stating that when two statutory provisions conflict, the specific provisions prevail over the general provisions); (same).

-75 (Minn.App.1996), overruled in part on other grounds by -24 (Minn.1998).