Cited by

And the Minnesota Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that this inquiry 6 should be “guided by the public policy that if criminal liability, particularly gross misdemeanor or felony liability, is to be imposed for conduct unaccompanied by fault, the legislative intent to do so should be clear.” (acknowledging that it is a “long established principle of American criminal jurisprudence that in common law crimes and in felony level offenses mens rea is required”).

Proof of a general-intent crime requires only evidence that “the defendant engaged intentionally in specific, prohibited conduct.” n.10 (Minn. 2000).

17 Strict liability criminal offenses are “generally disfavored.” see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994).

Proof of a general- intent crime requires only evidence that “the defendant engaged intentionally in specific, prohibited conduct,” n.10 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted), or, stated differently, evidence of “an ‘intention to make the bodily movement which constitutes the act which the crime requires,’” d 303, 308 (Minn. 2012) (quoting 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.2(e) (2d ed. 2003)).

See, (reading a knowledge requirement into possession-of -a- pistol-in-public statute); (reading a knowledge requirement into possession-of-a-knife-while-on-school-property statute); (reading a knowledge requirement into possession-of-a-controlled-substance statute).

that the respondent knowingly possessed the pistol”); -03 (Minn. 2000) (requiring state to prove that “the accused knew he possessed a knife while on school property” under felony offense prohibiting possession of dangerous weapon on school property).

at 417 (gross misdemeanor); (felony); Ndikum, d 9 at 818 (gross misdemeanor to potential felony); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 618 (1994) (felony).1 Warner’s

What is required is “only that the defendant engaged intentionally in specific, prohibited conduct.” n.10 (Minn. 2000) (emphasis omitted).

Strict liability criminal offenses are “generally disfavored.”

11 Accordingly, if the legislature intends t o create a strict-liability offense, it “should say so directly and unequivocally.” 809 (Minn. 2000).

Strict-liability statutes are “generally 5 disfavored,” and therefore, “legislative intent to impose strict criminal liability must be clear.”

But in we rejected the contention that a similarly sized pocketknife was inherently dangerous.13 The record in this case does not support a 12 Neither party to this appeal argues, or argued below, that A.D.

(noting the “long established principle of American criminal jurisprudence” that mens rea is required for common-law and felony crimes).

821 (Minn.2012) (holding that possession of a pistol in public requires knowing possession); (holding that the crime of possession of a knife on school grounds requires that the defendant know that he possesses the knife).

at 308 (quotation omitted); it “requires only that the defendant engaged intentionally in specific, prohibited conduct.” , 808 n. 10 (Minn.2000).

Ndikum, d at 822 (possession of a pistol in public); (possession of a knife at school).

(stating that it is a “long established principle ...

We incorporated the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the case of (“[Legislative intent to impose strict criminal liability must be clear.”).

1 Wayne R. La-Fave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.2(e) (2nd ed.2003) (explaining that general intent only requires an “intention to make the bodily movement which constitutes the act which the crime requires”); , 808 n. 10 (Minn.2000) (explaining that “[g]eneral intent requires only that the defendant engaged intentionally in specific, prohibited conduct”); cf. State v. Damuth, 135 Minn. 76, 80 , 160 N.W.

see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 , 114 S.Ct.

While the legislature has the authority to create strict-liability crimes, such crimes generally are disfavored; therefore, "legislative intent to impose strict criminal liability must be clear.”

In re Welfare *794 of C.R.M.