Cited by

Even if, in the context of the charges in this case, Hansen’s possession of the contents of the Tahoe on May 4 was other-bad-acts evidence, “a trial court’s failure to sua sponte strike unnoticed Spreigl evidence or provide a cau tionary instruction is not ordinarily plain error.”

(“[T]he real question before us is not whether the [district] court erred in admitting the evidence, but instead is whether the [district] court’s failure to sua sponte strike the testimony or provide a cautionary instruction was plain error.”).

(“[T]he real question before us is not whether the [district] court erred in admitting the evidence, but instead is whether the [district] court’s failure to sua sponte strike the testimony or provide a cautionary instruction was plain error.

However, an appellate court may consider a waived issue if there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) the error affects the defendant’s substantial rights.” -85 (Minn. 2001) (citation omitted).

(explaining that an appellate court may review unobjected-to error for (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights before the appellate court decides whether (4) the error seriously affected the fairness and integrity of the judicial p roceedings).

(“Because [defendant’s] attorney’s comments, viewed in context, do not constitute a confession, a new trial is not warranted on this basis.”).

See, (evidence of appellant’s actions was sufficient to support element of sexual intent); d 509, 510–11 (Minn. 1991) (same); (same).

“If these three prongs are met, the court must then decide whether it should address the issue in order to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” (quotation omitted).

“If these three prongs are met, the court must then decide whether it should address the issue in order to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” (quotation omitted).

If the three prongs of the plain-error standard are satisfi ed, “the court must then decide whether it should address the issu e in order to ensure fairness a nd the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” 85 (Minn. 2001) (quotation omitted).

The state argues that, because Acevedo did not object to the evidence he challenges on appeal, the relevant question is “whether the trial court erred by not sua sponte striking the disputed evidence.” In support of this argument, the state cites State v. Vick , in which the supreme court considered whether the district court committed plain error by admitting other -acts evidence “without adherence to the Spreigl procedural requirements.” Id.

14, 2010), or a touch with a benign intent, such as in the course of 5 caregiving activities

“ If these three prongs are met, the court must then decide whether it should address the issue in order to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” (quotation omitted).

State v. Vick , , 684 (Minn. 2001).

“It is well settled that one witness may not vouch for or against the credibility of another witness.” 9 (Minn. 2001) (quotation omitted).

Such vouching occurs when one witness testifies “for or against the credibility of another witness.”

“Failure to object to the admission of ev idence generally constitutes [forfeiture] of the right to appeal on that basis.”

“Failure to object to the admission of evidence generally constitutes [forfeiture] of the right to appeal on that basis.”

But “a [district] court’s failure to sua sponte strike unnoticed Spreigl evidence or provide a cautionary instruction is not ordinarily plain error.” State v. Vick

“A defendant bears a heavy burden to overturn a jury verdict.” d 676, 690 (Minn. 2001).

“A defendant bears a heavy burden to overturn a jury verdict.”

Given the heavy burden appellant must carry to overturn a conviction, we conclude that appellant’s conviction is supported by sufficient evidence.

“A defendant bears a heavy burden to overturn a jury verdict.”

Given the heavy burden she must carry to overturn a verdict, Johnson cannot prevail in light of the state’s evidence.

must carry to overturn a conviction, d 676, 690 (Minn. 2001), we conclude that the district court’s finding that A.G.