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But, as described above, all of the trial delays were ultimately attributable to him and any resulting prejudice is therefore “ameliorated by [his] acquiescence to the delay.” Osorio, d at 632; (“[A]lthough [a] defendant’s incarceration might have been unfortunate, the fact that much of the responsibility for that situation was his own weighs against his claim.”).

(“[A]lthough 12 defendant’s incarceration might have been unfortunate, the fact that much of the responsibility for that situation was his own weighs against his claim.”).

Similarly, in State v. Johnson , the supreme court denied defendant’s speedy -trial claim, concluding that defendant’s “own motions were the primary reason for much of the delay.”

A “delay occasioned by the defendant himself often is deemed a temporary waiver of his speedy trial demand, which can only be revived wh en the defendant reasserts his speedy trial right .”

See, (attributing 16 days of a 629-day delay to the prosecution and the remainder to the defendant for filing motions).

But “when the overall delay in bringing a case to tr ial is the result of the defendant’s actions, there is no speedy trial violation.”

Delay “occasioned by the defendant himself often is deemed a temporary waiver of his speedy trial demand, which can only be revived when the defendant reasserts his speedy trial right.”

In contrast, the Minnesota Supreme Court has “held on numerous occasions that when the overall delay in bringing a case to trial is the result of the defendant’s actions, there is no speedy trial violation.”

“[W]hen the 10 overall delay in bringing a case to trial is the result of the defendant’ s actions, there is no speedy trial violation.”

11 (Minn. 1993) (noting defendant’s seven -month delay in demanding a speedy trial after attempting to dismiss the charges “cannot be regarded as prompt or forceful”).

Accordingly, “the length of the delay only serves as a starting point for a speedy trial analysis.”

Even so, “the length of the delay only serves as a starting point for a speedy trial analysis.” d 10, 15 (Minn. 1993).

(“[D]elay occasioned by the defendant himself often is deemed a temporary waiver of his speedy trial demand.” (emphasis added)).

Even so, “the length of the delay only serves as a starting point for a speedy trial analysis.”

When a defendant causes the delay, this “often is deemed a temporary waiver of his speedy trial demand, which can only be revived when the defendant reasserts his speedy trial right.”

Even so, “the length of the delay only serves as a starting point for a speedy trial analysis.”

(holding that “the defendant’s claim fails under the [second] of the Barker considerations .

See, (attributing only 16 days of 629-day delay to state, while attributing remainder of 629-day delay to defendant’s motions).

And “when the overall delay in bringing a case to trial is the result of the defendant’s actions, there is no speedy trial violation.”

But if delay “is the result of the defendant’s actions, there is no speedy trial violation.”

[W]hen the overall delay in bring *145 ing a case to trial is the result of the defendant’s actions, there is no speedy trial violation.”

-17 (Minn.1993) (no constitutional violation where defendant’s motions were primary reason for delay); -15 (Minn.1989) (defendant’s late removal of judge and failure to inform assignment clerk of speedy-trial demand weighs against claimed violation of constitutional speedy-trial

Although the responsibility for an overburdened judicial system cannot rest with the defendant, “when the overall delay in bringing a case to trial is the result of the defendant’s actions, there is no speedy trial violation.”