Cited by

See Whitson, d at 305 (stating “the court’s instructions to the jury adequately ameliorated the risk of prejudice”); (concluding prosecutor’s misstatement of the law was harmless because the district court properly instructed jury on the law).

Whitson, d at 304; (concluding prosecutor’s misstatement of the law during closing argument was harmless in part because the district court properly instructed the jury on the law).

Williams-Gillard contends this misstated the law because a person is either a “principal or an accomplice to a crime” and, if a person is charged as an accomplice, “the state has to prove that the principal committed the offense, and the defendant intentionally aided it.” as support for the prosecutor’s argument.

unartful, not misconduct.”

“Character attacks are improper comments during a prosecutor’s closing argument.”

The purpose of accomplice liability is 6 clear, when two accomplices “point the finger at the other as the truly guilty one, the state may charge and prosecute both.”

“The purpose of [section] 609.05 is clear: with accomplice liability, even if two accomplices each point the finger at the other as the truly guilty one, the state may charge and prosecute both.”

Similarly, in State v. Atkins, the supreme court concluded that there was “more than sufficient evidence to conclude that [a] murder was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of [an] aggravated robbery.” 47 (Minn. 1996).

In recognition of inadvertent misstatements, the law only requires that closing arguments be “proper, not perfect.”

See State v. Atkins , (stating that “the jury is free to make reasonable inferences from evidenc e, including inferences based on their experiences or common sense ”).

at 357; (“[W]e conclude that the prosecutor was merely expressing the view that justice could only be achieved by convicting Atkins of first -degree murder, due to the overwhelming evidence establishing his guilt.”).

4 (2016); State v. Bates , 289 Minn. 157, 161, -90 (1971).

But “closing arguments must be proper, not perfect.” The prosecutor’s use of the word “flee” is supported by the record.

(explaining that a jury may infer that “a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions”).

“Character attacks are improper comments during a prosecutor’s closing argument.” –40 (Minn. 1994) (holding that references to a defendant’s nature were improper character comments).

See, e.g., Simion, d at 844 (holding it was not misconduct for a prosecutor to argue in closing argument that the defendant was trying to “dirty up” the victim during trial); -48 (Minn.1996) (holding the prosecutor’s statement that it would be an “unspeakable injustice” to convict the defendant of a lesser-included offense was not misconduct).

See, e.g., Si-mion, d at 844 (holding it was not misconduct for a prosecutor to argue in closing argument that the defendant was trying to “dirty up” the victim during trial); (holding the prosecutor’s statement that it would be an “unspeakable injustice” to convict the defendant of a lesser-included offense was not misconduct).

in which we concluded that there was no misconduct.

(“Viewing the * * * evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, the jury had more than sufficient evidence to conclude that [the victim’s] murder was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of * * * aggravated robbery * * *.”).

“Typically, the failure to object to a prosecutor’s statement forfeits a defendant’s right to have the issue considered on appeal.” () (quotation marks omitted).

the evidence, but give the defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubt.” Bailey argues that a jury’s real role requires “ ‘searching for doubt’ in all the evidence.” (“The prosecutor did tell the jury to ‘keep its eyes on the prize’ of truth * * *.”), (noting that the prosecutor told the jury that it “would be an ‘unspeakable injustice’ to consider the lesser-included offenses and to acquit on the charge of first-degree murder”), and that the court’s subsequent instruction removed any taint.

In closing, the state told the jury that Lopez-Rios “said words to the effect ‘I’m going to do the job.’ ” We conclude that the state’s remarks merely paraphrased the substance of the witness’s testimony and “at worst, [were] unartful, not misconduct.”

It is improper for a prosecutor to “seek justice beyond the parameters of the case.”