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For example, in State v. Kelley, the supreme court determined that evidence was admissible under rule 606(b) when one juror asked another to “step out into the hall to settle [a] dispute” and “threatened to injure the second juror.” 910-11 (Minn. 1994).

“A [district] court’s decision to deny a motion for a new trial on the basis of jury misconduct will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.”

A district court has discretion in determining whether or not to discharge a jury and may consider factors such as “the length of the trial, the nature or complexity of the case, the volume and nature of the evidence, the presence of multiple counts or multiple defendants, and the jurors’ statements to the court concerning the probability of agreement.” (quotation omitted).

On appeal from the postconviction denial, Kambon raises two issues he asserted in the district court and makes a new argument for the first time before us. 1 First, Kambon claims that the trial judge committed several procedural errors when the jury reported it was deadlocked during deliberations.

When a district court believes that the jury is at an impasse, it “may require the jury to continue their deliberations and may give or repeat an instruction” but it “shall not require or threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or 6 for unreasonable intervals.” (quotation omitted).

he court “should have exercised its discretion to inform the jury that a deadlock is a permissible outcome.” Anderson cites State v. Kelley to argue that the multiple jury questions required the district court to “have 7 exercised more caution” because the number of jury notes indicated that the jury was “having difficulty in determining whether the state had proven all of the elements .”

Similarly, the supreme court held that the district court erred by telling a deadlocked jury to “keep deliberating” because the supplemental instruction “may have led them to conclude that they were required to deliberate until a unanimous verdict was reached on each count.” Id.

“A [district] court’s decision to deny a motion for a new trial on the basis of jury misconduct will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.”

“A court, therefore, can neither inform a jury that a case must be decided, nor allow the jury to believe that a ‘deadlock’ is not an available option.” (- 73 (Minn. 1973) -10 (Minn. 1994)).

[but] [t]he court shall not require or threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals.” -12 (Minn. 1996) ().

As such, “[a district] court’s decision to deny a motion for a new trial on the basis of jury misconduct will not be overturned absent an a buse of discretion.”

“A [district] court’s decision to d eny a motion for a new trial on the basis of jury misconduct will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.”

The court shall not require or threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable inte rvals.” State v. Kelley , (quoting A.B.A.

(holding that court’s instruction to “keep working” to the jury during deliberations was plain error and took place during a critical stage of trial).

At a Schwartz hearing, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating actual bias , State v. Kelley , which refers to “a state of mind on the part of the juror, in reference to the case or to either party, which would prevent the juror from trying the issue impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of either party.” ( quotation o

Generally, “the length of time a jury may be kept deliberating” falls to the discretion of the district court judge, “but abuse of that discretion requires reversal.” (quotation omitted).

The court shall not require or threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals.” d 905, 909 (Minn. 1994) (quoting A.B.A.

(“[T]he defendant is not entitled to relief if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

(holding that party moving for new trial on grounds of juror misconduct bears burden to show both misconduct and prejudice); Minn. R. Civ.

It is not coercive to instruct a deadlocked jury to continue deliberating, so long as the district court does not “require or threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals.” (quotation omitted).

“The [district] court shall not require or threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals.” (quotation omitted).

see also Ford, d at 713 (holding that jury’s request for preservation of the deliberation materials was a housekeeping matter).

It is not coercive to instruct a deadlocked jury to continue deliberating, so long as the district court does not “require or threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals.” (quotation omitted).

-39 (Minn.1998); (citing A.B.A.

At a Schwartz hearing, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating actual bias, which refers to “a state of mind on the part of the juror, in reference to the case or to either party, which would prevent the juror from trying the issue impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of either party,” d at 629 n. 2 (Minn.2007).