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“[A] defendant’s right to testify in his or her own defense is protected by both the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution and Minnesota state law.”

XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 7; Minn. Stat. § 611.11 (2020); (stating that right to testify is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Minnesota state law).

XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. 1 § 7; Minn. Stat. § 611.11 (2021); see State v. 11 Ihnot, (stating that right to testify is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Minnesota state law).

See State v. Ihnot , ( stating that when a defendant’s credibility is a central issue of the case, “a greater case can be made for admitting the impeachment evidence, because the need for the evidence is greater.” (quotation omitted)).

A district court’s ruling on a request to impeach with evidence of a prior conviction “will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Ihnot , (quotation omitted).

In State v. Ihnot , the supreme 9 court explained that while the prior conviction was fairly old (also eight years), Ihnot’s subsequent convictions show “a pattern of lawlessness that indicates that the prior offense had not lost any relevance by the passage of time.” (M inn.

State v. Ihnot , -87 (Minn. 1998 ) (quotation omitted) .

experience difficulty in evaluating the effect of any abuse of discretion in this area without knowing the substance of any possible testimony.” n.3 (Minn. 1998).

d 581, 587 (Minn. 1998).

(concluding that defendant was not kept from testifying but instead chose not to testify based on impeachment evidence).

experience difficulty in evaluating the effect of any abuse of discretion in this area without knowing the substance of any possible testimony.” n.3 (Minn. 1998).

(recognizing that even “fairly old” convictions may establish “a pattern of lawlessness” that negates the effect of time passage); d 775, 785 (Minn. 2013) (stating that “any felony conviction is probative of a witness’s 4 credibility” (quotation omitted) ).

(d 534, 538 (Minn. 1978)) (holding that the Jones factors still apply even though Jones was decided before the adoption of Minn. R. Evid.

is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction”); d 581, 585 (Minn. 1998) (holding that “the date of the charged offense is the appropriate end point for the 10-year period that determines whether a conviction is stale under Minn. R. Evid.

n.3 (Minn. 1998); Gassler, d at 67.