Cited by

d 303, 309-10 (Minn. 2003) (stating that new-trial motion is not a prerequisite to appellate review of substantive legal issues properly raised and considered in district court); (stating that, absent motion for new trial, appellate courts may review whether evidence supports findings of fact and whether findings support conclusions of law and judgment).

6 (stating that courts generally will not modify ordinary rules and procedures because a self-represented party lacks the skills and knowledge of an attorney).

d 303, 309-10 (Minn. 2003) (stating that new trial motion is not prerequisite to appellate review of substantive legal issues properly raised and considered in district court); (stating that absent motion for 5 new trial, appellate courts may review whether evidence supports findings of fact and whether findings support conclusions of law and judgment).

And “[w]hile an appellant acting pro se is usually accorded some leeway in attempting to comply with court rules, he is still not relieved of the burden of, at least, adequately communicating to the court what it is he wants accomplished and by whom.” Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc., (citation omitted); (stating that a court will not modify ordinary rules and procedures because a pro se party lacks the skills and knowledge of an attorney).

(stating that “[a]lthough some accommodations may be made for [self-represented] litigants, this court has repeatedly emphasized that [self-represented] litigants are generally held to the same standards as attorneys and mu

-10 (Minn. 2003) (stating that new- trial motion is not prerequisite to appellate review of substantive legal issues properly raised and considered in district court); d 565, 569 (Minn. 1976) (stating that absent motion for new trial, appellate courts may review whether evidence supports findings of fact and whether findings support conclusions of law and judgment).

“While an appellant acting pro se is usually accorded some leeway in attempting to comply with court rules,” they are “not relieved of the burden of, at least, adequately communicating to the court what it is” they want “accomplished and by whom.” Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc., (stating that, generally, a court will not modify ordinary rules and procedures because a pro se party lacks the skills and knowledge of an attorney).

On appeal from a judgment , if there have been no posttrial motions, appellate review is limited to “whether the evidence sustains the findings of fact and whether such findings sustain the conclusions of law and the judgment.” d 711, 713 (Minn. App. 1986) (applying Gruenhagen).

y from introducing designated matters in evidence.” And “[w]hile an appellant acting pro se is usually accorded some leeway in attempting to comply with court rules, he is still not relieved of the burden of, at least, adequately communicating to the court what it is he wants accomplished and by whom.” Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc., (stating that courts generally will not modify ordinary rules and procedures because a pro se party lacks the 9 skills and knowledge of an attorney).

forfeits any such claim of error, and our review 1 “While an appellant acting pro se is usually accorded some leeway in attempting to comply with court rules, he is still not relieved of the burden of, at least, adequately communicating to the court what it is he wan ts accomplished and by whom.” Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc., (stating that a court generally will not modify ordinary rules and procedures just because a pro se party lacks the skills and knowledge of an 5 is limited to whether, upon

A pro se party “is held to the standard of an attorney in presenting [an] appeal.” (stating that generally, a court will not modify ordinary rules and procedures because a pro se party lacks the skills and knowledge of an attorney).

Because mother did not move for a new trial at the district court, as she admits, “the only questions for [our] review are whether the evidence sustains the findings of fact and whether such findings sustain the conclusions of law and the judgment .”

Gruenhagen v. Larson , (stating that court will not modify ordinary rules and procedures because a self-represented party lacks the skills and knowledge of an attorney); rev. denied (Minn. Oct.

(stating that absent motion for new trial, 4 appellate courts may review whether evidence supports findings of fact and whether findings support conclusions of law and judgment); K (stating, in a case in which the appellant did not seek distr

–10 (Minn. 2003) (stating that new-trial motion is not prerequisite to appellate review of substantive legal issues properly raised and considered in district court); Gruenhagen v. Larson , (stating that absent motion for new trial, appellate courts may review whether evidence supports findings of fact and whether findings support conclusions of law and judgment).

–10 (Minn. 2003) (stating that new-trial motion is not prerequisite to appellate review of substantive legal issues properly raised and considered in district court); Gruenhagen v. Larson, 310 Minn. 454, 458, (stating that absent motion for new trial, appellate courts may review whether evidence supports findings of fact and whether findings support conclusions of law and judgment).

Specifically, we will review “whether the evidence sustains the findings of fact and whether such findings sustain the conclusions of law and the judgment.”

That said, “this court has repeatedly emphasized that [self-represented litigants] are generally held to the same standards as attorneys and must comply with court rules.” Id.; see also Gruenhagen v. Larson , ( cautioning courts against modifying rules and procedures because self - represented litigant lacks skills or expertise of an attorney).

While more leeway is typically afforded to pro se litigants, they are “still not relieved of the burden of, at least, adequately communicating to the court what it is [they] want [] accomplished and by whom.” Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc. , see Gruenhagen v. Larson , (stating that court will not , generally, modify ordinary rules and procedures on the grounds that a pro se party lacks the skills and expertise of an attorney); Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald , (“Although some accommodations may be made fo

[and] the burden of showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it.” Waters v. Fiebelkorn , –65 ( Minn. 1944); (stating that generally, a court will not modify ordinary rules and procedures because a pro se party lacks the skills and knowledge of an attorney).

Generally though, “on appeal from a judgment where there has been no motion for a new trial the only questions for review are whether the evidence sustains the findings of fact and whether such findings sustain the conclusions of law and the judgment.”

-09, 311 (Minn. 2003); Gruenhagen v. Larson

“While an appellant acting pro se is usually accorded some leeway in attempting to comply with court rules, he is still not re lieved of the burden of, at least, adequately communicating to the court what it is he wants accomplished and by whom.” Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc. , see Gruenhagen v. Larson , (stating that , generally, a court will not modify ordinary rules and procedures because a pro se party lacks the skills and knowledge of an attorney); (stating that “[a]lthough some accommodation

“While an appellant acting pro se is usually accorded some leeway in atte mpting to comply with court rules, [she] is still not relieved of the burden of, at least, adequately communicating to the court what it is [she] wants accomplished and by whom.” Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc. , (stating that generally, a court will not modify ordinary rules and procedures because a pro se party lacks the skills and knowledge of an attorney); (“A lthough some accommodations may be made for pro se litigants, t

Because Takuanyi appealed from a judgment without moving for a new trial, the only questions for our review “are whether the evidence sustains the findings of fact and whether such findings sustain the conclusions of law and the judgment.”

City of Minneapolis v. Minneapolis Police Relief Ass'n , , 172 (Minn. App. 2011) (citing Alpha Real Estate Co. of Rochester v. Delta Dental Plan of Minn. , , 309-10 (Minn. 2003) ; Gruenhagen v. Larson , 310 Minn. 454 , , 569 (1976) ).

On appeal from a judgment when there has been no motion for a new trial, we review “whether the evidence sustains the findings of fact[,] and whether such findings sustain the conclusions of law.” Gruenhagen v. Larson, 310 Minn. 454, 458, -10 (Minn. 2003).

Wife relies on Gruenhagen v. Larson, 310 Minn. 454, and argues that the scope of this court’s review “is limited to determining whether the evidence sustains the findings of fact and the findings sustain the district court’s conclusions of law and judgment” because husband did not make any posttrial motions.

See, e.g., Gruenhagen v. Larson, 310 Minn. 454, 459 , (examining the plain meaning of Minn. R. Civ.

Gruenhagen v. Larson, 310 Minn. 454, 458

v. Cold Spring Granite Co., (citing Gruenhagen v. Larson, 310 Minn. 454, 458, ); see also Hartman v. Blanding’s Inc., 288 Minn. 415, 423

Gruenhagen v. Larson, 310 Minn. 454, 458

did not file a motion for new trial, our review is limited to substantive legal issues properly raised in and considered by the district court, whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether those findings support the conclusions of law and judgment.1 –310 (Minn. 2003); Gruenhagen v. Larson, 310 Minn. 454, 458

Gruenhagen v. Larson, 310 Minn. 454, 458