Cited by

(stating that the collective-knowledge doctrine pools the knowledge of the police force in establishing the basis for seizure of a person).

(stating that “the entire knowledge of the police force is pooled and imputed to the arresting officer for the purpose of determining if sufficient probable cause exists for an arrest.”) .

“Under the ‘collective knowledge’ approach, the entire knowledge of the police force is pooled and imputed to the arresting officer for the purpose of determining if sufficient probable cause exists for an arrest.”

on burglary schemes, evidence supported defendant’s attempted-theft conviction); (stating that evidence connecting defendant to prior theft offenses made his involvement in other theft offenses “more probable by shedding light not only on his intent and participation, but also on his knowledge, opportunity, and preparation.”); (“Intent to use burglary tools may be drawn from the character of the objects and from the circumstances surrounding their possession.”).

”); State v. Conaway , (imputing pooled knowledge of law enforcement to the acting officer).

Such intent “may be drawn from the character of the objects and from the circumstances surrounding [the defendant’s] possession.”

( (stating that “a criminal reco rd, even a ‘long’ one, is best used as ‘corroborative information’ and not as the so le basis for probable cause”)).

“The intent necessary is a general intent to use the tools in the commission of a bu rglary and not an intent to commit a particular burglary.” State v. Conaway

The required intent “may be drawn from the character of the objects and from the circumstances surrounding their possession.”

See, (using this colle ctive-knowledge approach when reviewing a warrantless arrest); (same).

The supreme court has repeatedly and consistently held that joinder is not prejudicial if “evidence of each offense would have been admissible Spreigl evidence in the trial of the other.”

20 prejudicial if “evidence of each offense would have been admissible Spreigl evidence in the trial of the other.”11

cotics that police saw in her hotel room, either as sole 5 In instances in which more than one police officer is involved in an investigation, the “entire knowledge of the police force is pooled and imputed to the arresting officer for the purpose of determining if sufficient probable cause existed for an arrest.” () (alterations omitted).

“Under the ‘collective knowledge’ approach, the entire knowledge of the police force is pooled and imputed to the arresting officer for the purpose of determining if sufficient probable cause exists for an arrest.” (emphasis omitted).

(stating that “the entire knowledge of the police force is pooled and imputed to the arresting officer for the purpose of determining if sufficient probable cause exists for an arrest” (emphasis omitted)).

Whether a defendant possessed the requisite intent under Minn. Stat. § 609.59 “may be drawn from the character of the objects and from the circumstances surrounding [the defendant’s] possession.”

n.2 (Minn. 2014) (applying collective-knowledge doctrine on review of legality of pat search); (applying collective-knowledge doctrine on review of legality of emergency-aid search of residence); (applying collective-knowledge doctrine on review of legality of arrest).

Under this doctrine, “the entire knowledge of the police force is pooled and imputed to the arresting officer for the 6 purpose of determining if sufficient probable cause exists for an arrest.”

Safety, (recognizing *426 that officer’s and dispatcher’s collective knowledge may provide reasonable articu-lable suspicion); (“Under the ‘collective knowledge’ approach, the entire knowledge of the police force is pooled and imputed to the arresting officer for the purpose of determining if sufficient probable cause exists for an arrest.”).

(imputing pooled knowledge of law enforcement to the acting officer).

When more than one officer is involved in an investigation, the “entire knowledge of the police force is pooled and imputed to the arresting officer for the purpose of determining if sufficient probable cause exist[ed] for an arrest.”