Cited by

Specifically, in the language highlighted by Wredberg, we were describing how the court of appeals “balanced the competing policy interest of the therapist-client privilege against the purpose of the [judicial proceedings]

To support his position, and Mahoney & d 302 (Minn. 2007).

1103, 1103 (Minn. 1895) (considering whether statements published in a court pleading are “absolutely privileged” and may not “be made the basis of an action for libel or slander”); –31 (Minn. 2020) (defining the elements of a defamation action); see also Mahoney & (extending absolute privilege to claims “frame[d]” as breach of confidences, invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy because the factual allegations supporting those claims “sound[ed] in defamation,” stating “[r]egardless of the lab

1103, 1103 (Minn. 1895) (considering whether statements published in a court pleading are “absolutely privileged” and may not “be made the basis of an action for libel or slander”); , 130– 31 (Minn. 2020) (defining the elements of a defamation action); see also Mahoney & 10 (Minn. 2007) (extending absolute privilege to claims “frame[d]” as breach of confidences, invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy because the factual allegations supporting those claims “sound[ed] in defamation,” stating “[

See Mahoney & Hagberg v. Newgard , (stating that “absolute privilege protects witnesses from lawsuits based on statements made during judicial proceedings”).

(2) made at a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding; and (3) the statement at issue is relevant to the subject matter of the litigation.” Mahoney &

The judicial-proceedings privilege is an absolute privilege that may bar a defamation action when the statement at issue is made “(1) made by a judge, judicial officer, attorney, or witness; (2) made at a judicial or quasi- judicial proceeding; and (3) the statement at issue is relevant to the subject matter of the litigation.” Mahoney &

relevant to the subject matter of the litigation.” Mahoney &

In addition to barring defamation claims, absolute privilege “also bars claims sounding in defamation—that is[,] claims where the injury stemmed from and grew out of the defamation.” Mahoney &

Mahoney & Hagberg v. Newgard , d 302, 306 (Minn. 2007).

See, i.e., 19-20 (Minn. App. 2006), aff’d

relevant to the subject matter of the litigation.” Mahoney & (citing Matthis v. Kennedy , ).

In short, “relevance is defined broadly.” Mahoney &

Typically, absolute privilege may protect defamatory statements if they are “(1) ma de by a judge, judicial officer, attorney or witness; (2) made at a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding; and (3) the statement at issue is relevant to the subject matter of the litigation.” Mahoney & Hagberg v. Newgard

In addition, the union relies on Mahoney & a defamation case, and argues that “in the context of defamation law .

Mahoney & -08 (Minn. 2007).

Wild, 302 Minn. at 447 , d at 793 ; see also Mahoney & (holding that the privilege applicable to defamation also applies to “claims where the injury stemmed from and grew out of the defamation”).