Cited by

“We presume that trial counsel’s performance was reasonable and we give particular deference to trial strategy.”

See also Nicks, d at 506 (stating that trial counsel has “wide latitude to determine the best strategy for the client”); (stating that we give “particular deference to trial strategy”).

As a result, “we presume that trial counsel’s performance was reasonable and we give particular deference to trial strategy.”

As with claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, trial counsel’s performance is also presumed reasonable, and we give particular deference to matters of trial strategy, id., such as whether to object to evidence.

Appellate counsel does not have an obligation to raise all possible claims on direct appeal, 17 and is “permitted to argue only the most meritorious claims.” Schneider v. State

See Schneider v. State , (rejecting contention that “trial counsel’s decision to forgo a Frye-Mack hearing was anything but a strategic and tactical decision”).

Trial counsel is presumed to have provided reasonable representation and “we give particular deference to trial strategy.”

(“We presume that trial counsel’s performance was reasonable.”) ; see also Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 -88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 -66 (1984) (“[S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judg

See Schneider v. State , d 516, 521 (Minn. 2007) (concluding ineffective-assistance-of-app ellate-counsel claim was not barred by Knaffla because appellant could not have known of appellate counsel’s ineffective assistance at the time of direct appeal).

See Schneider v. State , (“This claim is not barred by Knaffla because Schneider could not have known of ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel at the time of his direct appeal.”).

“We presume that trial cou nsel’s performance was reasonable and we give particular deference to trial strategy.”

See Schneider v. State , (explaining that appellate co unsel is “permitted to argue only the most meritorious claims”).

Trial counsel’s performance is presumed reasonable, and appellant bears the burden of proving both prongs of the Strickland test

.” Schneider v. 4 State, -22 (Minn. 2007).

Trial counsel’s performance is presumed reasonable, Schneider v. State , and appellant bears the burden of proving both prongs of the Strickland test

Trial counsel’s performance is presumed reasonable, Schneider v. State , and appellant bears the burden of proving both prongs of the Strickland test

(holding no ineffective assistance of counsel because “appellate counsel did not have a duty to include all possible claims on direct appeal, but rather was permitted to argue only the most meritorious claims”).

We presume trial counsel’s representation was reasonable and “give particular deference to trial strategy.”

We presume that a trial counsel’s performance is reasonable, and appellant has not demonstrated otherwise on appeal.

(stating that claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are 11 not Knaffla-barred in a first postconviction appeal because they could not have been raised earlier).