Cited by

15, 1989), and the defendant’s argument that the records are material and favorable to the defense must go beyond mere conjecture

And appellate courts “give great deference to a district court’s findings of fact and will not set them aside unless clearly erroneous.”

(explaining the high deference given to the dis trict court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations because it is in best position to make those findings); d 854, 870 (Minn. 2008) (stating “great deference” is given to a district court’s findings of fact and they will not be set aside “unless clearly erroneous”).

We will only set aside the district court’s findings of fact if they are clearly erroneous, that is, if we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” State v. Evans , (quotation omitted).

“The rationale for this rule is that the credibility of an accomplice is inherently untrustworthy.” State v. Evans

A district court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous when the appellate court is “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake ha s been made.” State v. Evans , (quotation omitted).

A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it leaves us “with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”

” State v. Evans , (quotations omitted).

The district court found that Natividad-Campos obtained the bond from Midwest Bonding “to assure his transfer back into ICE custody and eventual removal from the United States.” Appellate courts “give great deference to a district court’s findings of fact and will not set them aside unless clearly erroneous.” See State v. Evans

Although we conclude that the district court’s order for in camera revi ew is unauthorized for a different reason, we note that the supreme court has held that privileges “‘sometimes must give way to a defendant’s right to confront his accusers.’” (quoting State v. Kutchara , (M inn.

This court gives deference “to a district court’s findings of fact and [this court] will not set them aside unless clearly erroneous.”

–73 (Minn. 2008) (affirming district court’s decision to r eview only a portion of a medical record based on the date of the record).

“The clearly erroneous standard requires that we be left wit h the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”

FACTS The facts underlying Evans's conviction are found in State v. Evans ( Evans I ), , 859-62 (Minn. 2008).

See generally State v. Evans , , 872 (Minn. 2008).

We do not “set aside [a district court’s findings of fact] unl ess clearly erroneous.”

(explaining that a district court’s factual findings should not be disturbed if there is re asonable evidence supporting those findings).

“We give great deference to a district court’s findings of fact and will not set them aside unless clearly erroneous.” State v. Evans

At a Schwartz hearing, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating actual bias , State v. Kelley , which refers to “a state of mind on the part of the juror, in reference to the case or to either party, which would prevent the juror from trying the issue impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of either party.” ( quotation omitted).

However, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses “o perates as a limit on that discretion.”

Minnesota courts have permitted a photograph of a murder victim wearing his police uniform, –79 (Minn. 2008), testimony that the victim was honorably discharged from the military, and testimony that the victim was a police officer’s son

d 854, 872-73 (Minn. 2008) (applying an abuse- of-discretion standard in reviewing district court’s decision to limit its in camera review).

Federal caselaw has recognized that the attorney-client privilege must, if necessary, yield “to ensure the level of cross-examination demanded by the Sixth Amendment.” Murdoch v. Castro, 365 F.3d 699, 702 (9th Cir. 2004); (acknowledging that privileges must give way to a defendant’s right to confrontation in narrow circumstances).

A finding is clearly erroneous if there is no reasonable evidence to support it, leaving this court with the “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” (quotation omitted).

State v. Evans (Evans I)

VI, XIV; Minn. Const. art. I. §§ 6, 7