Cited by

at 222 ( (Meyer, J., concurring) (“Although we eventually abandoned the special jury instruction, we retained the traditional rational hypothesis review standard.”); State v. Jones , n.4 (Minn. 1994) (holding that Turnipseed contr

(plurality opinion), illustrates this principle.

“Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” d 709, 714 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).

The circumstances proved “do not include every circumstance as to which there may be some testimony in the case, but only such circumstances as the jury finds proved by the evidence.” (quotation omitted).

(“A conviction based on circumstantial evidence receives stricter scrutiny than a conviction based on direct evidence.”).

“To successfully challenge a conviction based upon circumstantial evidence, a defendant must point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than his guilt.” (quotation omitted).

State v. Stein , (“A conviction based on circumstantial evidence receives stricter scrutiny than a conviction based on direct evidence.”).

( stating that “[j]uries are generally in the best position to weigh the credibility of the evidence and thus determine which witnesses to believe and how much weight to give their testimony” (quotation omitted) ); (deferring to the jury’s decision whether to credit witness testimony).

(“A conviction based on circumstantial evidence receives stricter scrutiny than a conviction based on direct evidence.”).

r the jury to determine because “[j]uries are generally in the best position to weigh the credibility of the evidence and thus determine which witnesses to believe and how much weight to give their testimony.” 332-33 (Minn. 2010) (concluding circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of first-degree murder); (deferring to the jury’s credibility determinations in identifying the circumstances proved).

(explaining that “[t]o successfully challenge a conviction based upon circumstantial evidence, a defendant must point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than .

We must “assume the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence.” (quotation omitted).

(“A conviction based on circumstantial evidence receives stricter scrutiny than a conviction based on direct evidence.”).

The circumstances proved “do not include every circumstance as to which there may be some testimony in the case, but only such circumstances as the [fact-finder] finds proved by the evidence.” (quotation 26 omitted).

Andersen, d at 329–30 ( for the proposition that this court “give[s] no deference to the fact finder’s choice between reasonable inferences”).

“Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than 8 guilt.” (quotation omitted).

“Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” (quotation omitted).

In doing so, we defer to the fact-finder’s “acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the State.” Andersen, d at 329 (d 709, 714 (Minn. 2010) (plurality opinion)).

Even if it was possible that the Ariz ona Tea can belonged to someone else, “possibilities of innocence do not require reversal of a jury verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.” (quotation omitted).

But even if there was evidence supporting these acts being accidents, “possibilities of innocence do not require reversal of a jury verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.” (quotation omitted).

In considering the reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstances proved, we “give no deference to the fact finder’s choice between reasonable inferences.” State v. Stein , (plurality opinion).

2, 1985); see also State v. Stein , 6 (“To successfully challenge a conviction based upon circumstantial evidence, a defendant must point to evidence in the record that is consistent with a rational theory other than his guilt.

But “possibilities of innocence do not require reversal of a jury verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories see m unreasonable.”

See State v. Stein , d 709, 719 (Minn. 2010).

(“W here the jury has rejected conf licting facts and circumstances, we do not draw comp eting inferences from those f acts on appeal.”).

In performing this analysis, we will “view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict and assume the jury be lieved the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary evidence.” State v. Stein , (quotation omitted).

“[P]ossibilities of innocence do not require reversal of a jury verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.” State v. Stein , (quotation omitted).

verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem reasonable.” (quotation omitted).

see also Harris, d at 600 (“[T]he first step .

“[P]ossibilities of innocence do not require reversa l of a jury 6 verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.” (quotation omitted).

“[P]ossibilities of innocence do not require reversal of a jury verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.” State v. Stein , (quotation omitted).

“[P]ossibilities of innocence do not require rever sal of a jury verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.” State v. Stein , (quotation omitted).

Thus, although the forensic scientist could not rule out the possibility of a secondary transfer, mere possibilities are not grounds for reversal “so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes suc h theories seem unreasonable.” (quotation omitted); (An appellate court “will not overturn a conviction based on circumstantial evidence on the basis of mere conjecture.”).

(“Where the jury has rejected conflicting facts and circumstances, we do not draw competing inferences from those facts on appeal.”).

“[P]ossibilities of innocence do not require 8 reversal of a jury verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.” State v. Stein , (Mi nn.

“[P]ossibilities of innocence do not require reversal of a jury verdict so long as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.” (quotation omitted).

See State v. Stein , d 709, 714 (Minn. 2010) (“Even in cases ba sed on circumstantial evidence, however, we have recognized that the jury is in the best position to eval uate the evidence, and we will not overturn a conviction based on circumst antial evidence on the basis of mere 10 conjecture.”) (quotations omitted).