Cited by

Typically, “[t]he district court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment is not within the scope of review on appeal from a judgment entered after a jury verdict.” (syllabus).

See, (reversing and remanding to the court of appeals to consider an unaddressed alternative argument); (reversing and remanding to the court of appeals to consider issues that it did not initially address).

(holding that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not within the scope of review on an appeal from judgment entered after a jury verdict).

n.9 (Minn. 2009); see also Schmitz v. Rinke, Noonan, Smoley, Deter, Colombo, Wiant, Von Korff & Hobbs, Ltd., rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

Ctr., Inc., (“[W]here the totality of the evidence did not support a finding of malice, the matter should not have been submitted to the jury.”); (stating that malice becomes a jury question if the plaintiff’s evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, could lead a reasonable jury to conclude the defamatory statements were made with malice).

21 Corp., (reversing and remanding to the court of appeals to consider issues that it did not initially address).

We also agree that Yusuf’s (“The scope of review refers to the matters that are properly before the appellate court for its consideration.” (quotation omitted)).

d 910, 919 (Minn. 2009).

The verdict “will not be set aside if it can be sustained on any reasonable theory of the evidence.” Longbehn v. Schoenrock , ; (“If reasonable jurors could differ on the conclusions to be draw n from the record, [JMOL] is not appropriate.”).

It is not the insured’s obligation to show that the exclusion has become operative.” (citations omitted)), overruled on other grounds

App. P. 103.04 (“On appeal from or review of an order the appellate courts may review any order affecting the order from which the appeal is taken and on appeal from a judgment may review any order involving the merits or affecting the judgment.”); (explaining that a denial of a motion for summary judgment based on a genuine dispute of fact cannot be characterized as “affecting the judgment” after a trial on the merits).

“If reasonable jurors could differ on the conclusions to be draw from the record, [JMOL] is not appropriate.”

upreme Court has previously recognized a qualified privilege for statements made in the following relevant contexts: an employer’s good-faith statements about a former employee in a requested character reference, Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., statements made in relation to an employer’s investigation into employee misconduct, an employer’s communication to a former employee of the reasons for 7 the employee’s discharge, Lewis v. Equitable Life Assur.

Co., d 910 (Minn. 2009).

Judgment as a matter of law is not appropriate “[i]f reasonable jurors could differ on the conclusions to be drawn from the record.”

-19 (Minn. 2009) (holding that, after a case has been tr ied to a jury, the earlier deni al of a motion for summary judgment is not properly within the scope of review on appeal from the judgment); Schmitz v. Rinke, Noonan, Smoley, Deter, Colombo, Wiant, Von Korff and Hobbs, Ltd., d 733, 744 (Minn. Ap

-19 (Minn. 2009) (“We therefore hold that the denial of respondents’ motion for summary judgment is not properly within the scope of review on appeal from the judgment and we will not consider it.”).

When appealing a district court’s decision to deny its motion for judgment as a matter of law , an appellant’s submission must permit this court to determine whether the re cord contains “any competent evidence reasonably tending to sustain the verdict.” (quotation omitted); see also , Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp. , (noting that when reviewing decisions to grant or deny motions for judgment as a matter of law, appellate courts apply the same standard as the district court, viewing the evidence in

However, “[w]here a trial has been held and the parties have been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate their claims, it makes no sense whatever to reverse a judgment on the verdict where the trial evidence was sufficient merely because at summary judgment it was not.”

“If the defamation affects the plaintiff in [her] business, trade, profession, office or calling, it is defamation per se and thus actionable without any proof of actual damages.” Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp. , (quotation omitted).

Appellate courts “apply de novo review to the district court’s denial of a Rule 50 motion.”

918-19 (Minn. 2009) (adopting federal rule that denial of summary-judgment motion is not properly within scope of review on appeal from judgment).

Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp. , , 920 (Minn. 2009).

T h i s c o u r t “ h a s t h e a u t h o r i t y t o r e v i e w o r d e r s t h a t ‘ a f f e c t ’ t he judgment being appealed.” (citing Minn. R. Civ.

“To establish a defamation claim, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) the defamatory statement is communicated to someone other than the plaintiff , (2) the statement is false, and (3) the statement tends to harm the plaintiff’s reputation and to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of the community.” Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp. , -20 (Minn. 2009) (quotation s omitted).

Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp.

8 T h i s c o u r t “ h a s t h e a u t h o r i t y t o r e v i e w o r d e r s t h a t ‘ a f f e c t ’ t he judgment being appealed.” (citing Minn. R. Civ.

See Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp. , , 918 (Minn. 2009).

Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp.

Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp.