Cited by

Counsel acts reasonably when “exercis[ing] the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” State v. Bobo , (quotation omitted).

4 Although the unconstitutional closure of a courtr oom is generally considered to be structural error, Minnesota courts have not squarely addressed whether unobjected-to structural error requires automatic reversal or whether a defendant’s failure to object at trial triggers a plain -error analysis.

See State v. Bobo (Bobo I ), Bobo v. State (Bobo II), Bobo v. State (Bobo III)

A violation of the public-trial right “is considered a structural error that is not subject to a harmless error analysis.” (quotation omitted).

d 129, 139 (Minn. 2009).

For this ar gument, Klitzke cites to State v. Bobo

A violation of the public-trial right “is considered a struct ural error that is not subject to a harmless error analysis.” State v. Bobo

5 harmless error analysis.” State v. Bobo , (citations omitted).

A violation of the right to a public trial “is considered a structural error that is not subject to a harmless error analysis,” State v. Bobo , and generally requires the automatic reversal of a conviction

State v. Bobo , State v. Voorhees

But “[i]t is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to misstate the evidence.”

And “[t]he unconstitutional denial of a defendant’s right to a pub lic trial is considered a structural error that is not subject to a harmless error analysis.” d 129, 139 (Minn. 2009).

State v. Pearson , State v. Bobo

the requirements of Waller by providing: The court may order voir dire closed only if it finds a substantial likelihood that conducting voir dire in open court would interfere with an overriding interest, including the 7 A violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to a public trial “is considered a structural error that is not subject to a harmless error analysis.” d 129, 139 (Minn. 2009); see also Waller, 467 U.S. at 49 n.9, 104 S. Ct. at 2217 n.9 .

A p rosecutor may “present all legitimate arguments on the evidence and all proper inferences that can be drawn from that evidence,” but may not “misstate the evidence.” State v. Pearson , (quotations omitted).

Moreover, Strother was acquitted on three counts, specifically two charges of fourth-degree criminal- sexual conduct and one count of domestic assault by strangulation, “undercutting the alleged inflammator y effect of the argument.” -43 (Minn. 2009) (“Bobo was not convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, the most serious charged crime, undercutting the alleged inflammatory effect of the argument.”).

7 Bobo, (q uotation omitted).

Andersen v. State , State v. Bobo

(stating it is prosecutorial misconduct to intentionally misstate the evidence or make arguments unsupported by the evidence).

at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064

d 129, 137 (Minn. 2009).

When assessing an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, a ppellate courts use a “two -pronged analys is, focusing on whether counsel’ s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and whether a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’ s errors.” d 129, 137 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted).

An attorney’s “fail[ure] to make an objection that would not succeed is not professionally unreasonable .”

“It is unprofessional conduct for the pros ecutor to intentionally misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.” d 129, 143 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted).

Prosecutors may present “legitimate arguments on the evidence, to analyze and explain the evidence, and to present all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom,” but it is “unprofessiona l conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.” (citation omitted).

Additionally, determining which witnesses to call constitutes trial strategy, “which lie[s] within the proper discretion of trial counsel and will generally not be reviewed later for competence.” (stating that counsel’s decision regarding which witnesses to call involves “trial strategy that [an appellate court] will not review”).

(“During closing argument, a prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from evidence in the record.”).

Second, the defendant must show that “a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s errors.” (quotation omitted).