Cited by

(applying plain-error review to a postconviction claim that required us to analyze the unobjected-to introduction of evidence at trial).

( concluding that the record supported the postconviction court’s findings concerning the petitioner’s ability to understand English ); (“We have reviewed the transc ript, and agree with the [district] court’s finding that [defendant] possessed

When applying the Strickland test to appellate counsel, we begin by observing that counsel “is not required to raise al l possible claims on direct appeal .”

(applying the Strickland test to an ineffective-assistance-of-appellate- counsel claim).

To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must demonstrate that: (1) “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984)).

the district court applied the standard that an appellate counsel’s performance is not objectively 5 unreasonable for not pursing a claim counsel could legitimately conclude would fail.

d to show (1) that his attorney’s representation “ ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ ” and that (2) “ ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 16 different.’ ” Martin, d at 587 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984))

See Arredondo v. State , -73 (Minn. 2008) (affirming second-degree intentional murder verdicts “if the defendant believed his act would result in death” (quotation omitted)).

But appellate attorneys are “not required to raise all possible claims on dir ect appeal, and counsel need not raise a claim if they ‘could have legitimately concluded that it would not prevail.’” (citation omitted).

Without additional facts, “any conclusions reached by [an appellate] court as to whether [a defendant’s] attorney’s assistance was deficient would be pure speculation.” Id.; n.4 (Minn. 2008); Jackson, d at 463

See Arredondo v. State , -73 (Minn. 2008); review denied (Minn. Aug.

Appellate counsel does not have a “duty to raise all possible issues, and may choose to present only the most meritorious claims on appeal.” (explaining also that “[a]ppellate counsel does not act unreasonably by 12 not raising issues that he or she could have legitimately concluded would not prevail”); Leake , d at 536

“Appellate counsel is not required to raise all possible claims on direct appeal, and counsel need not raise a claim if [he] could have legitimately concluded that it would not prevail.” (quotation omitted).

“Appellate counsel is not required to raise all possible claims on direct appeal, and counsel need not raise a claim if she could have legitimately concluded that it would not prevail.” Arredondo v. Stat e, (quotation omitted).

“Appellate counsel is not required to raise all possible claims on direct appeal, and counsel need not raise a cl aim if she could have legitimately concluded that it would not prevail.” (quotation omitted).

But appellate counsel is not required to raise a claim if counsel “could have legitimately concluded that it would not prevail.” ().

(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064 , 2068 (1984)).

(explaining that “[a]ppellate counsel is not required to raise all possible claims on direct appeal”).

Smith’s attorney was not required to raise every conceivable claim on direct appeal, and “counsel need not raise a claim if she could have legitimately concluded that it would not prevail.” (quotation omitted).

Without those additional facts, “any conclusions reached by [an appellate] court as to whether [a defendant’s] attorney’s assistance was deficient would be pure speculation.” Id.; n.4 (Minn. 2008); Jackson, d at 463

Moreover, “[a]ppellate counsel is not required to raise all possible claims on direct appeal, and counsel need not raise a claim if she could have legitimately concluded that it would not prevail.” (quotation omitted).

Tscheu, d at 863 (involving a case in which the law had not changed during the pendency of the appeal); (same); (same); (same); (same); (same).

midt, in his reply brief, then characterize his appeal as challenging the assistance of appellate counsel, stating that “[t]o determine whether Mr. Schmidt’s appellate counsel could have legitimately concluded that Mr. Schmidt would not have prevailed on his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, this Court must ‘turn to an examination of the merits of that claim.’ ” In short, Schmidt attempts to revive his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim by posthumously characterizing it i

(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).