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See State v. McDaniel , (stating misstatement of burden of proof is “highly improper” and prosecutorial misconduct).

A prosecutor improperly shifts the burden of proof “when they imply that a defendant has the burden of proving his innocence.” (quotation omitted).

A prosecutor improperly shifts the burden of proof “when they imply that a defendant has the burden of proving his innocence.” (quotation omitted).

Minnesota appellate courts have found “prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct only in extreme circumstances[.]”

However, “courts must look at the closing argument as a whole, rather than just selective phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence to determine whether reversible error has occurred.” (quotation omitted).

Garbow also failed to establish that any misconduct “likely played a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict.” (noting harmless error standard for objected-to, but less-serious, allegations of 21 prosecutorial misconduct).

d 739, 750 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted); , 122 (Minn. 2009)

For example, he points to cases involving threats to potential witnesses, -83 (Minn. 2006), pre-arrest flight from officers, -47 (Minn. 2010), and intentional destruction of a crime scene, Roy, d at 171.

However, “a prosecutor’s comment on the lack of evidence supporting a defense theory does not improperly shift the burden,” and a prosecutor “may argue that particular witnesses were or were not credible,”

If “the case involves less serious prosecutorial misconduct,” we will reverse and remand for a new trial if “the misconduct likely played a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict.” (quotation omitted).

A prosecutor improperly shifts the burden of proof “when they imply that a defendant has the burden of proving his innocence.”

” (quotation omitted); -32 (Minn. App. 2003).

Appellate courts must first determine “whether or not there was an objection at trial to the claimed misconduct.” -94 (Minn. 2007) (determining that “the prosecutor’s conduct was improper” and applying a harmless-error analysis).

A prosecutor improperly shifts the burden of proof “when they imply that a defendant has the burden of proving his innocence.”

(questioning whether this two-tiered approach is still good law, while declining to decide the question); Carridine, d at 146 (same).

Comments that misstate or dilute the state’s burden of proof are “highly improper and constitute[] prosecutorial misconduct.” (quotation omitted).

But comments that misstate or dilute the state’s burden of proof are “highly improper and constitute[] prosecutorial misconduct.” State v. 8 McDaniel, (quotation omitted).

A prosecutor engages in misconduct by violating established standards of conduct or caselaw, and “[o]ur standard of review depends on whether or not there was an objection at trial to the claimed misconduct,” d 739, 749 (Minn. 2010).

–53 (Minn. 2010) (concluding that “misconduct did not play ‘a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict’” when “[t]here was ample evidence that supported McDaniel’s conviction for aiding and abetting first-degree premeditated murder, and the misconduct was sporadic, minimal, and rectified by the cour

And comments that address a central issue in a case are permissible when the comment “merely summariz[es] the key issue that would impact the jury’s determination of g uilt.”

To do so “is highly improper and constitutes prosecutorial misconduct.” (quotation omitted).

Comments that misstate or dilute the state’s burden of proof are “highly improper and constitute[] prosecutorial misconduct.” (quotation omitted).

To meet this burden, the state must show that there is no “reasonable likelihood that the error actually 17 impacted the verdict.”

(noting two-tiered harmless-error test for objected-to prosecutorial misconduct and declining to decide if two-tiered approach remains valid).

C. Shifting the Burden of Proof A misstatement of the burden of proof is “highly improper and constitutes prosecutorial misconduct.” (quotation omitted).

If the prosecutor shifted the burden of proof, it is “highly improper and constitutes prosecutorial misconduct.” (quotation omitted).

The misconduct affected substantial rights if there is “a reasonable likelihood that the error actually impacted the verdict.”

To demonstrate that the misconduct did not affect substantial rights, the state must show that there is not “a reasonable likelihood that the error actually impacted the verdict.”