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The state can demonstrate lack of prejudice by showing that there is not “a reasonable likelihood that the error actually impacted the verdict.”

“Although a prosecutor can argue that a particular defense has no merit, a prosecutor may not belittle the defense, either in the abstract or by suggesting that the defense was raised because it was the only defense that might succeed.” (quotation omitted); (“[I]t is improper to disparage the defense in closing arguments or to suggest that a defense offered is some sort of standard defense offered by defendants when nothing else will work.” (Quotation omitted.)

Misstating or shifting the burden of proof is “highly improper and constitutes prosecutorial misconduct.” (quotation omitted).

The state can demonstrate lack of prejudice by showing that there is not “a reasonable likelihood that the error actually impacted the verdict.”

Second, the district court sustained appellant’s objection and immediately instructed the jury to 7 disregard the remark, which “significantly reduced the impact of the state’s improper question[] on the jury verdict.” (“[C]orrective instructions by the [district] court can cure prosecutorial error.”).

But “a prosecutor’s comment on the lack of evidence supporting a defense theory does not improperly shift the burden.” d 62, 69 (Minn. 1993) (“A remark by a prosecutor on the lack of evidence regarding the defense’s theory did not shift the burden of proof to the defense.”).

See State v. Caine , (noting that flight is evidence of consciousness of guilt); (noting that resisting arrest is admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt).

d 644, 652 (Minn. App. 2014) (“Having opened the door to the prosecutor’s argument, appellant can hardly complain now.”).

State v. Cao , Minn. R. Crim.

“However, a prosecutor’s comment on the lack of evidence supporting a defense theory does not improperly shift the burden.” State v. McDaniel

To determine whether reversible error has occurred, this court considers the closing argument as a whole, rather than “selective phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given un due prominence.” (quotation omitted).

If a prosecutor intentionally elicits inadmissible evidence, a new trial may be ordered if the inadmissible evidence was prejudi cial in the sense that it “played a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict.” (quotation omitted).

there was an objection at trial to the claimed misconduct.”

345, 347 (Minn. 1918); (stating that we presume sentencing statutes to be constitutional).

Flight from police, as the “ consummate act of evasion ,” is “certainly suggestive” of wrongdoing , id., and may indicate consciousness of guilt

For claims of misconduct during closing argument, we consider the argument “as a whole, rather than just selective phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence.” (quotation omitted).

Under the harmless-error framework, serious misconduct warrants reversal unless it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, while less serious misconduct warrants reversal if it “likely played a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict.” d 739, 749 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).

“A prosecutor commits misconduct by commenting on a defendant’s failure to call a witness , because such a comment suggests that the defendant has some sort of burden of proof.”

For objected- to prosecutorial misconduct, we apply a two-tiered harmless-err or test, the application of which varies based upon the severity of the misconduct.6 d 739, 749 (Minn. 2010).

If a prosecutor intentionally elicits inadmissible evidence from a state’s witness, a new trial may be appropriate if the inadmissible evidence was prejudicial in the sense that it “played a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict.” See State v. McDaniel , (quotation omitted) ; see also State v. McNeil , -32 (Minn. App. 2003); cf. State v. Mahkuk , -90 (Minn. 2007) (cautioning that reversal may be appropriate re medy for intentionally eliciting inadmissible evidence even if not preju

The supreme court has held that prejudicial prosecutorial error is generally found “only in extreme circumstances.”

See State v. McDaniel , (holding that flight sug gests consciousness of guilt and that evidence of other motivations for flight goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence of the flight).

(noting it has “not yet decided whether this two -tiered approach” remains viable) ; State v. Ramey , n.4 (Minn. 2006) (“We leave for another day the question of whether the .

d 739, 748-49 (Minn. 2010).

Appellant cites State v. McDaniel , to support his argument that a nexus must exist between the crime charged and the consciousness-of-guilt conduct.

(stating that consciousness of guilt can le ad a defendant to flee police, even if there are other motivations, and it is the jury’s job to determine if a defendant’s story is credible).

State v. Thao , , 841 (Minn. 2016) ; see State v. McDaniel , , 748-49 (Minn. 2010) (holding that the district court properly admitted gang expert testimony because it "described gang culture generally, and the role of retaliation and respect in gang culture," even though other witnesses testified that the defendant was part of the gang, because "[the expert] did not offer his o

In reviewing whether reversible error has occurred , “[appellate] courts must look at the closing argument as a whole, rather than just selective phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence.” (quotation omitted).

State v. McDaniel , 9 (Minn. 2010) (citing State v. Caron, 300 Minn. 123, 127 -28, ).