Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite State v. Bjergum, 771 N.W.2d 53.

43 citing documents.

State of Minnesota v. Jared James Sprowls Minn. Ct. App. 2025
We have recognized that the statement “I am going to kill you” might indicate “anger, or frustration 10 without an intent to kill.”
State of Minnesota v. Antonio Harris Minn. Ct. App. 2025
(explaining the context of a statement “may indicate anger, or frustration without an intent to kill”), rev. denied (Minn. Nov.
State of Minnesota v. Jared Anthony Norman Minn. Ct. App. 2025
-57 (Minn. App. 2009), rev. denied (Minn. Nov.
State of Minnesota v. Joe Cecil Sistrunk Minn. Ct. App. 2024
(noting that intoxication is only a defense to specific-intent crimes); -58 (Minn. App. 2009) (determining that the jury did not need to receive an intoxication instruction because terroristic threats made with reckless disregard is not a specific-intent crime).
State of Minnesota v. Scott William Mooney Minn. Ct. App. 2023
(“Because the reckless-disregard portion of the terroristic-threats statute does not include specific intent as an element, the voluntary-intoxication instruction was not warranted.”), rev. denied (Minn. Nov.
In the Matter of the Welfare of: E. E. M., Child Minn. Ct. App. 2023
“Recklessness requires deliberate action in disregard of a known, substantial risk.” d 53, 57 (Minn. App. 2009), rev. denied (Minn. Nov.
State of Minnesota v. Tobias Osric Smith Minn. Ct. App. 2023
“Because threats are context specific, a person who might lack a specific intent to threaten or terrorize may nevertheless utter an objectively threatening statement recklessly, committing [the offense of threats of violence ].” State v. Bjergum , (noting that “[r]ecklessness requires deliberate action in disregard of a known, substantial risk”) , rev. denied (Minn. Nov.
State of Minnesota v. Rafael Sharif Hassan, II Minn. Ct. App. 2023
(quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Nov.
Matthew Howard Isensee v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2022
“Because threats are context specific, a person who might lack a specific intent to threaten or terrorize may nevertheless utter an objectively threatening statement recklessly, committing a terroristic-threats crime.” rev. denied (Minn. Nov.
State of Minnesota v. Gerald Edward Bolster Minn. Ct. App. 2022
Under the reckless -disregard prong of the threats -of-violence statute , an individual need not have the specific intent of terrorizing another, but rather “recklessly risks the danger that the statements would be taken as threats by another and that they would cause extreme fear.” State v. Bjergum , (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Nov.
State of Minnesota v. David Deluna Minn. Ct. App. 2021
State of Minnesota v. Marsean Juan Crockett Minn. Ct. App. 2021
review denied (Minn. Nov.
Catherine Ann Moore v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2020
or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience.” This court has held that “recklessly making terroristic threats is not a specific-intent crime.”
State of Minnesota v. Meade Terrell Stademeyer Minn. Ct. App. 2020
contains no specific-intent element.” review denied (Minn. Nov.
State of Minnesota v. Chase Allen Holmes Minn. Ct. App. 2020
” , review denied (Minn. Nov.
State of Minnesota v. Donald Joseph Hall, Jr. Minn. Ct. App. 2020
review denied (Minn. Nov.
State of Minnesota v. Adam John Barthel Minn. Ct. App. 2020
5 Barthel claims plain error in the district court’s failure to instruct the jury on a definition of “reckless” or “recklessly.” In support of his claim, he points to this court’s statement that “[r]ecklessness requires deliberate action in disregard of a known, substantial risk.” review denied (Minn. Nov.
State of Minnesota v. Joseph Frank Rezac Minn. Ct. App. 2020
In State v. Bjergum, this court held that a person “who might lack a specific intent to threaten or terrorize may nevertheless utter an objectively threatening statement recklessly, committing a terroristic-threats crime.” review denied (Minn. Nov.
Elwin Louis Klimek v. State of Minnesota Minn. Ct. App. 2019
The threat need not be intentional: “declaring the intent to injure by an unlawful act constitutes a terroristic threat when the person who utters the statement recklessly disregards the risk of terrorizing another.” review denied (Minn. Nov.
State of Minnesota v. Darsche Chaudaun Wharry Minn. Ct. App. 2019
review denied (Minn. Nov.
State of Minnesota v. Bryce Monroe Muir Minn. Ct. App. 2018
review denied (Minn. Nov.
State of Minnesota v. Anansa Ashanti McIntosh-Spicer Minn. Ct. App. 2018
State of Minnesota v. Kevin Bernard Thompson Minn. Ct. App. 2018
[It] might convey an actual intent to kill, [but] it also may indicate anger, or frustration without an intent to kill, or even humor.” , review denied (Minn. Nov.
State of Minnesota v. Bobby Joe Houle Minn. Ct. App. 2017
review denied (Minn. Nov.
State of Minnesota v. Wilmer Govani Montoya Ulloa Minn. Ct. App. 2017
Appellant argues that his actions were plausibly transitory anger meaning that “he used words or actions expressing anger [because his cousin was dating his wi fe] but without an intent to terrorize.” The statement “I am going to kill you” is “objectively a 8 threat to commit homicide, but the context may establish something else.”
State of Minnesota v. Gregory Allen Olson 887 N.W.2d 692 Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Gregory Allen Olson 887 N.W.2d 692 Minn. Ct. App. 2016
ether a statement is a threat “turns on whether the communication in its context” would reasonably “create apprehension that its originator will act according to its tenor.” Schweppe, 306 Minn. at 399, d at 613 (quotations omitted) (concluding statements defendant made to juvenile’s friends about wanting to kill juvenile and his mother constituted threats); d 53, 56 (Minn. App. 2009) (determining that “the statement, ‘I am going to kill you’ is objectively a threat to commit homicide,” but depen
State of Minnesota v. Bayyinah Jameelah Shelton Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Bayyinah Jameelah Shelton Minn. Ct. App. 2016
In the context of a terroristic-threats conviction, “[r]ecklessness requires deliberate action in disregard of a known, substantial risk.” review denied (Minn. Nov.
State of Minnesota v. Terry Lee Allford Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Terry Lee Allford Minn. Ct. App. 2016
(“The terms ‘threatens’ and ‘reckless disregard’ do not transform the recklessness-related portion of the terroristic-threats statute into a specific-intent crime.”), review denied (Minn. Nov.
State of Minnesota v. Daniel Barenburg Minn. Ct. App. 2016
State of Minnesota v. Daniel Barenburg Minn. Ct. App. 2016
And “a person who might lack a specific intent to threaten or terrorize may nevertheless utter an objectively threatening statement recklessly, committing a terroristic-threats crime.” review denied (Minn. Nov.
State of Minnesota v. Timothy John Bakken Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Timothy John Bakken Minn. Ct. App. 2015
6 In reckless disregard of the risk of causing terror In the context of a terroristic-threats conviction, “[r]ecklessness requires deliberate action in disregard of a known, substantial risk.” review denied (Minn. Nov.
State of Minnesota v. Bradley Scott Junker Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Bradley Scott Junker Minn. Ct. App. 2015
“[D]eclaring the intent to injure by an unlawful act constitutes a terroristic threat when the person who utters the statement recklessly disregards the risk of terrorizing another.” review denied (Minn. Nov.
State of Minnesota v. Lori Ann Fulwiler Minn. Ct. App. 2015
State of Minnesota v. Lori Ann Fulwiler Minn. Ct. App. 2015
(citing Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd.
State of Minnesota v. Bernard Miles Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Bernard Miles Minn. Ct. App. 2014
- 10 (Minn. 2012) (discussing intent requirements for assault); (discussing intent requirements in terroristic threats statute), review denied (Minn. Nov.
State of Minnesota v. Dusty Lee Littledog Minn. Ct. App. 2014
State of Minnesota v. Dusty Lee Littledog Minn. Ct. App. 2014
(stating that a defendant recklessly disregards the risk of terrorizing another if 7 he recklessly risks the possibility that his statements would be taken as threats by another and that they would cause extreme fear, but it is not necessary to p