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“When conducting our review, we consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, accepting those facts as true and must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” (quotation omitted); Minn. R. Civ.

“[A] pleading will be dismissed only if it appears to a certainty that no facts, which could be introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would support granting the relief demanded.” see also Minn. R. Civ.

(“A plaintiff must provide more than labels and conclusions.”).

We “consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, accepting those facts as true and must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” (quotation omitted).

See Hansen v. U. S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, –6 (Minn. 2019) ().

We affirm dismissal only “if it appears to a certainty that no facts, which could be introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would support granting the relief demanded.” , 80 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted) (failure to state a claim); Brenny, d at 420 (subject-matter jurisdiction).

§ 363A.15(1); d 76, 81 (Minn. 2010) .

must establish the following elements: ‘(1) statutorily-protected conduct by the employee; (2) adverse employment action by the employer; and (3) a causal connection between the two.’” (quoting Hoover, d at 548).

(stating that legal conclusions in complaints are not binding and that “[a] plaintiff must provide more than labels and conclusions”).

(holding in a Minn. R. Civ.

(“To help us determine if a cause of action exists under the MHRA, it is appropriate to call on the interpretations of the federal anti- discrimination statutes when the provisions of the federa l statute and the MHRA are similar.”); (“In construing the MHRA, we apply law develo ped in federal cases arising under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.” (quotation omitted)).

An order dismissing a complaint under rule 12.02 is reviewed de novo and will be upheld when it is not “possible on any evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded.”

“[A] pleading will be dismissed only if it appears to a certainty that no facts, which could be introduced consistent with the 6 pleading, exist which would support granting the relief demanded.” (quotation omitted).

In agreeing that the district court correctly dismissed Halva’s claim under the Data Practices Act, the court of appeals reasoned that [a]t the pleading stage, the plaintiff cannot allege mere “labels and conclusions.”

But we need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true; a sufficient complaint “must provide more than labels and conclusions.”

5 “A plaintiff must provide more than labels and conclusions.”

A district court may grant a motion to dismiss filed pursuant t o rule 12.02(e) “only if it appears to a certainty that no facts, which could be introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would support granting the relief demanded.” (quotation omitted).

e standards to govern whether a plaintiff has alleged statutorily protected conduct under the MHRA—one standard that requires the plaintiff to “plead opposition to a practice that is actually forbidden under the MHRA” and one standard that merely requi res the plaintiff to plead “a good-faith, reasonable belief that the opposed prac tice was forbidden under the MHRA.”

(citation omitted); see also Bahr v. Capella Univ ., (discussing standard of review).

We “consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, accepting those facts as true and must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” (quotation omitted).

Dismissal under rule 12.02(e) is appropriate “only if it appears to a certainty that no facts, which could be introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would support granting the relief demanded.” (quotation omitted).

At the pleading stage, the plaintiff cannot allege mere “labels and conclusions.”

(quoting N. States Power Co. v. Franklin , (noting that because t he only factual information on a motion to dismiss is that which is disclosed by the pleadings as a whole, the dismissal function is “extremely limited”)); d

8 Minnesota courts considering MHRA reprisal claims may “apply law developed in federal cases arising under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.” (quotation omitted).

or speculate that such circumstances may arise, Jackson v. Reiling , (precluding “remote” or “speculative” damages) .

This court “must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” (quotation omitted).

d 76, 80 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).

“[A] pleading will be dismissed only if it appears to a certainty that no facts, which could be introduced consistent with the pleading, exist which would suppo rt granting the relief demanded .” (quotation omitted).

“A plaintiff must provide more than labels and conclusions.”