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“We give great deference to a district court’s findings of fact and will not set them aside unless clearly erroneous.”

At this stage, “we give no deference to the fact finder’s choice between reasonable inferences.” -30 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).

“Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if, on the entire evidence, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” State v. Andersen

This court presumes that the affidavit supporting the search warrant is valid, Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 8 (1978), but the “warrant is void, and the fruits of the search must be excluded, if the application includes intentional or reckless misrepresentations of fact material to the findings of probable cause,” (quotation omitted).

And the supreme court observed that it “did not adopt the rule advocated by the concurrence” in State v. Andersen, 20 — which had “urged the [supreme] court to adopt a rule requiring district courts to provide a rational-hypothesis instruction to the jury in circumstantial evidence cases”— and that the supreme court has not overruled Turnipseed.

(“[W]e will not overturn a conviction based on circumstantial evidence on the basis of mere conjecture.” (quotation omitted)).

Appellate courts “give great deference to a district court’s findings of fact and will not set them aside unless clearly erroneous.”

Applying our clearly erroneous standard of review to this issue, “[f]indings of fact are clearly erroneous if, on the entire evidence, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.”

Id.; (“[W]e do not review each circumstance proved in isolation.

(stating that a reviewing court “will not overturn a conviction based on circumstantial evidence on the basis of mere conjecture” (quotation omitted)); Al-Naseer, d at 480 (stating that a theory is not “conjecture or speculation” when a defendant “points to evidence in the record that is

In identifying the circumstances proved, appellate courts defer “to the jury’s acceptance of the proof of these circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances proved by the State.” d 303, 310 (Minn. App. 2023) ().

During this step, we do not defer “to the fact finder’s choice between reasonable inferences.” d 320, 329-30 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).

“We give great deference to a district court’s findings of fact and will not set them aside unless clearly erroneous.”

“[W]e give no deference to the factfinder’s choice between reasonable inferences.” -30 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).

During this step, we do not defer “to the fact finder’s choice between reasonable inferences.” - 30 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).

- 32, 336 (Minn. 2010) (affirming a murder conviction based on circumstantial evidence and considering Andersen’s false statements to law enforcement as supporting the verdict).

In considering whether a reasonable inference is inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt, we consider the circumstances proved as a whole, not individually, Silvernail, d at 599 , and we “will not overturn a conviction based on circumstantial evidence on the basis of mere conjecture.” (quotation omitted).

During this step, we do not defer “to the fact finder’s choice between reasonable inferences.” -30 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).

Appellate courts “examine independently the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved; this includes inferences consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt.” (quotation omitted).

9 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).

To support a conviction, “the circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.”

During this step, we do not defer “to the fact finder’s choice between reasonable inferences.” -30 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).

“Instead, we must consider whether the circumstances presented are consistent with guilt and inconsistent, on 12 the whole, with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” d 320, 332 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).

In this step, we “examine independently the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved, [including] inferences consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt.” (quotation omitted).

Appellate courts also “give great deference to a district court’s findings of fact and will not set them aside unless clearly erroneous.”

To affirm, “the circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypotheses except that of guilt.”

In this step, we do not defer “to the fact finder’s choice between reasonable inferences.” - 30 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).

“We give great deference to a district court’s findings of fact and will not set them aside unless clearly erroneous.”

During this 8 step, we do not defer “to the fact finder’s choice between reasonable inferences.” -30 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).

Appellate courts “examine independently the reasonableness of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved; this includes inferences consistent with a hypothesis other than guilt.” (quotation omitted).