Cited by

See, (stating that the reasonableness of an officer’s actions in a probable-cause analysis is “an objective inquiry” and the “actual, subjective beliefs of the officer are not the focus in evaluating reasonableness” (quotation omitted)); (stating that

“Nonetheless, the reasonableness of the officer’s actions is an objective inquiry, even if reasonableness is evaluated in light of an officer’s training and experience.” (quotation omitted).

“A jury instruction is erroneous if it materially misstates the applicable law.”

But the reasonableness of an officer’s actions is “an objective inquiry” and the “actual, subjective beliefs of the officer are not the focus in evaluating reasonableness.” (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted).

“The actual, subjective beliefs of the officer are not the focus in evaluating reasonableness.”

offense if they found Young not guilty of the greater offense, which suggested the order the jury should consider the charges and deprived Young of having the jury considering his presented defense.” In general, a district court must instruct a jury in a way that “fairly and adequately explain[s] the law of the case” and does not “materially misstate[] the applicable law.”

“A jury instruction is erroneous if it materially misstates the applicable law.”

Lester, d at 771; (“The actual, subjective beliefs of the officer are not the focus in evaluating reasonableness.”).

“A jury instruction is erroneous if it materially misstates the applicable law.”

(“The actual, subjective beliefs of the officer are not the focus in 3 The state asserts that, even if the odor of marijuana is the only factual finding left to support probable cause, it is sufficient because the search was conducted before the supreme court issued its opinion in Torgerson and

When determining whether there is probable cause, the question is “whether the totality of the facts and circumstances known would lead a reasonable officer to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the suspect has committed a crime.” (quotation omitted).

A person may be required to submit to a chemical test when the “officer has probable cause to believe the person was driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle while impaired.” (quotation omitted).

(stating that the test refusal statute “incorporates the requirement from section 169A.51 that an officer may request that a person submit to a chemical test when the officer ‘has probable cause to believe the person 8 was driving, operating, or in

A district court must instruct the jury in a way that “fairly and adequately explain[s] the law of the case” and does not “materially misstate[] the applicable law.”

A district court must instruct the jury in a way that “fairly and adequately explain[s] the law of the case” and does not “materially misstate[] the applicable law.”

(“Where there is a conflict between the Minnesota Jury Instructions Guide, Criminal (CRIMJIG) and the statute or our case law, the latter two control.” ()); (noting that model jury instructions “are not the law”).

“A properly objected-to instructional error regarding an element of an offense requires a new trial only if it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had no significant impact on the verdict.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

19, 2007); 3 (“The plain language of section 169A.20, subdivision 2, .

See, –66 (Minn. 2011) (citing Blasus, d at 541, in stating that harmless-error review is not about “whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a jury finding with respect to the element of the offense on which the jury was erroneously instructed”).

or 169A.52 (test refusal or failure; revocation of license).” “[S]ection 169A.20, subdivision 2, in turn, incorporates the requirement from section 169A.51 that an officer may request that a person submit to a chemical test [only] when the officer ‘has probable cause to believe the person was driving, 11 operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle’ while impaired.” (quoting Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd.

“A properly objected-to instructional error regarding an element of an offense requires a new trial only if it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had 5 no significant impact on the verdict.” (quotations omitted).

unless it can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that an officer had ‘probable cause to believe the person was driving, 5 operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle’ while impaired.” (quoting Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd.

to support his argument that evidence of the glass pipe, without evidence showing the glass pipe was used for illegal purposes, was insufficient to establish probable cause.

“Generally, we do not address issues the petitioner fails to raise in a petition for further review because such a failure waives the issue on appeal.”

See Britton, d at 88 (“[W]e examine whether the [officer’s] suspicion was objectively reasonable.”); (stating 10 that in determining whether there was probable cause, “the reasonableness of the officer’s actions is an objective inquiry, even if reasonableness is evaluated in light of an officer’s training and experience” (quotation omitted)).

-62, 364 (Minn. 2011); State 8 v. Vang, (stating that a district court errs in instructing the jury when its instructions “confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law”).

A district court must instruct the jury in a way that “fairly and adequately explain[s] the law of the case” and does not “materially misstate[] the applicable law.”

(stating that probable cause is required for a test-refusal conviction); Mesenburg v. Comm ’r of Pub.