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Similarly, “[u]nder the invited error doctrine, a party cannot assert on appeal an error that [they] invited or that could have been prevented at the district court,” but “[t]he invited 7 error doctrine does not apply, however, if an error meets the plain error test.”

(declining to “reach the issue of the continued applicability of the Caron test to objected-to prosecutorial misconduct” based on the conclusion “that the one instance of objected-to prosecutorial misconduct here is harmless even under the standard for more serious misconduct”); see also State v.

XIV, § 1; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986); -37 (applying Batson).

("Because we conclude that the one instance of objected-to prosecutorial misconduct here is harmless even under the standard for more serious conduct, we do not reach the issue of the continued applicability of the [two-tiered harmless-error] test to objected-to prosecutorial misconduct.”).

In analyzing a prosecutor’s arguments, we review the arguments “as a whole, rather than just selective phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence.” (quotation omitted).

XIV, § 1; Batson, 476 U.S. at 84; -37 (Minn. 2012) (applying Batson).

If Brown shows plain error, “[t]he burden then shifts to the State to demonstrate that the error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights.”

“District courts are entitled to considerable latitude when selecting language for jury instructions, but an instruction that materially misstates the law is error.”

district court concluded that the prosecutor’s reasons for exercising the peremptory strike were race neutral and “sufficient to overcome a Batson challenge.” 3 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution prevents parties from striking prospective jurors based solely on their race); -37 (Minn. 2012) (applying Batson).

(stating that modified plain-error test would apply to claim of misconduct by not making pre-trial disclosure of witness interviews); -47 (Minn. 2012) (applying modified plain-error test to claim of misconduct in jury selection); -95 (Minn. App. 2021) (applying modified plain-error test to claim of misconduct by eliciting inadmissible evidence).

In determining whether a prosecutor misstated the law, this court reviews their arguments “as a whole, rather than just selective phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence.” (quotation omitted).

A person is the initial aggressor if they “began or induced the incident” by engaging in activity that is a “good deal greater than mere conversation.” (quotation omitted).

Defense counsel then argued that these reasons for exercising the peremptory strike were 1 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution forbids the striking of prospective jurors based solely on their race); -37 (Minn. 2012) (applying Batson).

To determine whether the prosecutor misstated the burden of proof in closing argument, we assess the argument “as a whole, rather than just selective phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence.” (quotation omitted).

A person is the initial aggressor if they “began or induced the incident” by engaging in activity that is a “good deal greater than mere conversation.” (quotation omitted).

(d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006)).

-49 (Minn. 2012) (concluding that emphasizing the lack of evidence supporting an affirmative defense was not misconduct); -25 (Minn. 2009) (concluding that responding to a suggestion that witnesses could not be trusted was not misconduct) .

To determine whether the prosecutor misstated the burden of proof in closing argument, reviewing courts look at the argument “as a whole, rather than just selective phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence.” (quotation omitted).

Under this doctrine, “a party cannot assert on appeal an error that he invited or that could have been prevented at the district court.” d 130, 142 (Mi nn.

Under this standard, if the appellant 6 establishes that the misconduct was both error and plain, “[t]he burden then shifts to the State to demonstrate that the error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights.”

When reviewing for plain error, we consider if “(1) there is error, (2) the error is plain, and (3) the error affects substantial rights.” State v. Carridine , (Minn. 1 We note that the state argues that Anderson waived her right to appellate review of this issue when she stipulated to the admission of the BCA lab results.

But the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that a justifiable -taking-of-life instruction is inappropriate when a defendant is charged with intentional murder but claims at trial that the killing was unintentional because the instruction “improperly implies that the defendant must believe it necessary to kill in order for the killing to be justified.” (d 806, 806 n.1 (Minn. 1993)).

To determine whether the prosecutor misstated or shifted the burden of proof in closing argument, we look at the argument “as a whole, rather than just selective phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence.” (quotation omitted).

Generally, “[u]nder the invited error doctrine, a party cannot assert on appeal an error that he invited or that could have been prevented at the district court.” (noting that “a defendant cannot on appeal raise his own trial strategy as a basis for reversal”).

The postconviction court agreed with the state that that based on State v. Carridine , , the erroneous instruction did not satisfy the prejudice prong of the two -part ineffective -assistance-of-counsel test identified in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) : 5 [T]he State established that [Camp] intentionally caused S.P.’s death and there is not a rational basis for acquitt