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Generally, “[u]nder the invited error doctrine, a party cannot assert on appeal an error that he invited or that could have been prevented at the district court.” (noting that “a defendant cannot on appeal raise his own trial strategy as a basis for reversal”).

The postconviction court agreed with the state that that based on State v. Carridine , , the erroneous instruction did not satisfy the prejudice prong of the two -part ineffective -assistance-of-counsel test identified in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) : 5 [T]he State established that [Camp] intentionally caused S.P.’s death and there is not a rational basis for acquitt

A verdict may be impeached by testimony establishing that a juror (Minn. 1968); (2) that we assess whether we have discretion to grant relief for all categories of unpreserved errors (invited errors, consented -to errors, and unobjected-to errors) under the plain error doctrine, –49 (Minn. 2008); ; State v. Goelz , State v. Giese , ; and (3) that we may grant relief for invited errors that seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, (Minn. 2015

d 130, 150 (Minn. 2012) (discussing State v. Caron , which sets forth the two-tiered approach); Whitson, d at 304 n.2 (stating that “[r]ecent cases have questioned whether the two-tiered Caron standard .

But as a general rule, under the invited -error doctrine, “a party cannot assert on appeal an error that he invited or that could have been prevented at the district court.”

When reviewing jury instructions, we recognize that “district cour ts are entitled to cons iderable latitude when selecting language for jury instructions.” State v. Carridine

“Evidentiary rulings rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted).

“The plain error test gives us discretion to review unobjected-to errors if: (1) there is error, (2) the error is plain, and (3) the error affects substantial rights.”

When reviewing jury instructions , we recognize that “distr ict courts are entitled to considerable latitude when selecting language for jury instructions.” State v. Carridine

“The Minnesota Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that i t is error to provide the justifiable-taking-of-life instruction, instead of the general self -defense instruction, when the defendant asserts self-defense but claims that the [victim’s] death was not the intended result.” State v. Pollard , , 179 (Minn. App. 2017) ( -44 (Minn. 2012); - 33 (Minn. 1998); State v. Robinson , -3 (Minn. 1995); ).

stood some distance away from Skolte’s trailer and did not move his hands until Skolte’s revolver was pointed in his direction ; up until that point t he interaction between the two men could be characterized as “mere conversation.” State v. Carridine , , 145 (Minn. 2012) (stating that conduct “a good deal greater than mere conversation” is required to establish provocation (quotation omitted)).

“Under the invited error doctrine, a party ca nnot assert on appeal an error that he invited or that could have been pr evented at the district court.” State v. Carridine

“Evidentiary rulings rest within the soun d discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted).

(“We have stated that when a defendant asserts self -defense and claims that the resulting death was unintentional, it is inappropriate to give the justifiable-taking-of-life instruction.”).

See State v. Carridine , (“Although the justifiable-taking-of-life jury instructions were given in error, we conclude that [the appellant] failed to establish that his substantial rights were affected by these instructions.”).

For claims of prosecutorial misconduct to which the defense did not object, appellate courts apply the “modified plain-error test.”

at 811; (“To determine whether a peremptory strike was discriminatory, we apply the three -step test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky .”); Minn. R. Crim.

(stating that the supreme court “do[es] not agree that the district court must, or even should, interfe re with the trial strategy of the defendant”); (stating that “[t]he invited error doctrine does not apply .

(“The invited error doctrine does not apply .

If the appellant demonstrates that the misconduct was both error and plain , “[t]he burden then shifts to the [s]tate to 7 demonstrate that the error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights.”

See State v. Carridine , (noting unsettled state of law, but declining to decide whether the two-tiered Caron standard should apply to cases of objected-to prosecutorial misconduct); see also State v. Tayari-Garrett , d 644, 651 (Minn. App. 2014), review denied (Minn. Mar.

Jefferson bears the burden of s howing that there was misconduct constituting error and that the error was plain; to be plain, the error must “contravene[] case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” State v. Carridine , (quotation 14 omitted).

” “ Under the invited error doctrine, a party cannot assert on appeal an error that he invi ted,” unless he can establish that the “error meets the plain error test.” State v. Carridine

Accordingly, we apply “a modified plain-error test.”

Under that test, the defendant bears the burden of showing that there was misconduct constituting error and that the error was plain; to be plain, the error must “contravene[] case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” (quotation omitted).

This court “review[s] a district court’s decision to give a requested jury instr uction for an abuse of discretion.” .

State v. Whitson , & n.2 (Minn. 2016)

“Arguments that shift the burden of proof to the defendant to prove his innocence are improper.”

See e.g. State v. Carridine , -44 (Minn. 2012) (concluding that the justifiable -taking-of-life instruction was given i n error where the defendant's defense was that the death was unintended).

(stating that the court did not define what is considered more than conversation).