Cited by

9 For this reason, –44 (Minn. 2012), where we held that a defendant who requested that the district court give a certain jury instruction could not on appeal claim that this instruction was an error, differs from this case.

d 130, 142 (Minn. 2012).

For objected-to prosecutorial misconduct, “we have utilized a harmless-error test, the application of which varies based on the severity of the misconduct.”

Traditionally, “[t]o determine whether a peremptory strike was discriminatory, we apply the three-step test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Batson.” .

12 “District courts are entitled to considerable latitude when selecting language for jury instructions, but an instruction that materially misstates the law is error.”

See, (stating that “[t]he invited error doctrine prevents a party from asserting an error on appeal that he invited or could have prevented in the court below” (emphasis added)); (stating that “[u]nder the invited error doctrine, a party cannot assert on appeal an error that he invited or that could have been prevented at the district court”).

In analyzing a prosecutor’s closing arguments, we review the arguments “as a whole, rather than just selective phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence.” (quotation omitted).

at 811; (“To determine whether a peremptory strike was discriminatory, we apply the three -step test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Batson .

Cross-Examination “When reviewing objected-to alleged prosecutorial misconduct, [appellate courts] have utilized a harmless-error test, the application of which varies based on the severity of the misconduct.”

At oral argument, the state also raised concerns about “invited error.” (“[A] party cannot assert on appeal an error that he invited”).

If an appellant did not object at trial to conduct that is alleged on appeal to be misconduct, we apply a “modified plain-error test.”

Buchanan, d at 547; s -45 (Minn. 2012) (suggesting that “initiat[ing] [a] verbal argument” can render someone the initial aggressor).

Although the supreme court has called into question the continued viability of this two-tiered approach, we affirm here because, even assuming the prosecutor here committed “serious” misconduct, the misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

An “initial aggressor” begins or induces an incident by engaging in activity that is a “good deal greater than mere conversation.” (d 405, 412 (Minn. 2006)).

For objected-to prosecutorial misconduct, “we have utilized a harmless-error test, the application of which varies based on the severity of the misconduct.”

For objected-to prosecutorial misconduct, “we have utilized a harmless- error test, the application of which varies based on the severity of the misconduct.”

(applying the harmless-beyond-a- reasonable-doubt test and declining to “reach the issue of the continued applicability of the Caron test to objected to prosecutorial misconduct”).

XIV, § 1; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986); -37 (applying Batson).

See State v. Carridine , 8 (Minn. 2012).