Cited by

-52 (Minn. 2012) (rejecting an absurdity challenge to a provision of the workers’ compensation statute).

(“The supreme court has emphasized that the absurdity rule of construction ‘is not available to override the plain language of a clear and unambiguous statute, except in an exceedingly rare case in which the plain meaning of the statute utterly confounds the clear legislative purpose of the statute.’” ()); (“If the statute’s unambiguous language merely produces a troubling result, we must apply it without reference to its drafting history.” (quotation omitted)); (“Be

“‘Vested’ property rights are those that have ‘become so fixed that it would be inequitable to abrogate [the right] by retrospective legislation.’” 10 ().

657 (Minn. 2012); In re Individual 35W Bridge Lit.

This rule, however, “is not available to override the plain language of a clear and unambiguous statute, except in an exceedingly rare case in which the plain meaning of the statute utterly confounds the clear legislative purpose of the statute.” (quotation omitted).

But these interpretive directives referenced by Snell are canons of construction, which, generally, are “not available to override the plain language of a clear and unambiguous statute.” –80 (Minn. 2021) (“We do not apply constitutional avoidance statutory interpretation principles when .

See Schroeder v. Simon , (“Issues of constitutional interpretation are questions of law, which we review de novo.”); 12 (“The interpretation and construction of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo.”).

Reviewing courts “presume that Minnesota statutes are constitutional and will only strike down statutes as unconstitutional when absolutely necessary.” d 643, 653-54 (Minn. 2012).

The supreme court has emphasized that the absurdity rule of construction “is not available to override the plain language of a clear and unambiguous statute, except in an exceedingly rare case in which the plain meaning of the statute utterly confounds the clear legislative purpose of the statute.” (quotation omitted).

d 643, 657 (Minn. 2012) (reviewing as-applied challenges to the constitutionality of statutes de novo).

See, (stating that “[h]istorically, we have limited the property rights that are entitled to due process to real property rights, final judgments, and certain vested statutory rights”).

23 871, 877 (Minn. 2020); (explaining that even an “absurd or unreasonable” result generally does not “override the plain language of a clear and unambiguous statute”).

19, 1993); (noting that it is “exceedingly rare” for this court to override a statute’s plain language and that we do so only when “the plain meaning of the statute ‘utterly confounds’ the clear legislative purpose of the statute,” and has only done so once, in Wegener).

(absurdity canon); (constitutional-avoidance canon).

“This rule of construction applies when the words of the statute are ambiguous.”

We consider whether an unambiguous statute creates absurd results only in the “exceedingly rare case[s] in which the plain meaning of the statute ‘utterly confounds’ the clear legislative purpose of the statute.” 51 (Minn. 2012) (quoting Weston v. McWilliams & Assocs., Inc., ).

d 643, 651 (Minn. 2012) (explaining that the “rule of construction” that “the Legislature did not intend a result that is absurd or unreasonable” only “applies when the words of the statute are ambiguous” and should not be used to “override the plain language of a clear and unambiguous statute, except in an exceedingly r

(applying de novo standard of review to district court’s interpretation of the law); (applying de novo standard of review when determining constitutionality of a statute).

This rule, however, “is not available to override the plain language of a clear and unambiguous statute, except in an exceedingly rare case in which the plain meaning of the statute utterly confounds the clear legislative purpose of the statute.” (quotation omitted).

Reviewing courts presume that duly enacted Minnesota statutes are “constitutional and will only strike down statutes as unconstitutional when absolutely necessary.” –54 (Minn. 2012).

(stating that when construing an ambiguous statute, “we presume that the Legislature did not intend a result that is absurd or unreasonable”).

651 (Minn. 2012) (addressing an argument asserting that the plain language of a statute leads to an unfair or unusual result as an absurdity argument); see also State v. Overweg , , 184-85 (Minn. 2019) (collecting cases and noting our frequent rejection of the absurdity doctrine even where the interpr

651 (Minn. 2012) (noting that an absurd result can override plain statutory language only in an "exceedingly rare case"); see also State v. Ortega-Rodriguez , , 646-47 (Minn. 2018).

Appellate courts “routinely reject equal-protection claims w hen a party cannot establish th a t h e o r s h e i s s i m i l a r l y situated to those whom they cont end are being treated different ly.” (quotation omitted).

651 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).