Cited by

In addition, “a defendant’s failure to seek a writ of prohibition constitutes waiver of further appellate review when the issue involves the right of peremptory removal.” Hooper v. State , n.4 (Minn. 2013) (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted).

“A motion to remove for cause is committed to the discretion of the [district] court and this court will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion.” (quotation omitted).

n.2 (Minn. 2013); n.2 (Minn. 2018); n.3 (Minn. 2019).

“A court may only consider an otherwise Knaffla-barred claim in two circumstances: if (1) the defendant presents a novel legal issue or (2) the interests of justice require the court to consider the claim.” (quotation omitted).

n.3 (Minn. 2019); n.2 (Minn. 2018); n.2 (Minn. 2013).

“A motion to remove for cause is committed to the discretion of the [district] court and this court will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion.” (quotation omitted).

-88 (Minn. 2013) (stating that a reviewing court will decline to apply the Knaffla exceptions if they are not raised by the 5 petitioner).

n.3 (Minn. 2016); n.3 (Minn. 2013).

(reasoning that a postconviction court’s failure to evaluate a claim under the correct test was harmless because the petitioner would not have succeeded under the correct test based on the postconviction court’s findings).

4(a) (2022), and a procedural bar rejecting claims that were raised or could have been raised on direct appeal or in a previous postconviction petition, Knaffla, d at 741.

To support his argument, he cites our decision in Hooper v. State , , which held that the State must rais e the section 590.01, subdivision 4, time-bar as an affirmative defense, or the argument is forfeited.

- 82 (Minn. 2013); - 07 (Minn. 2012) (holding that the related time limit in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

“The Knaffla rule provides that when a petition for postconviction relief follows a direct appeal of a conviction, all claims raised in the direct appeal and all claims of which the defendant knew or should have known at the time of the direct appeal are procedurally barred.” Hooper v. State (Hooper I), (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“The Knaffla rule also bars consideration of claims that were raised , or could have been raised, in a previous postconviction petition.” Hooper v. State

But “the postconviction statute contains an exclusivity provision that provides a strong indication that [it] merely codified or replaced preexisting remedies, including the common-law writs of habeas corpus and coram nobis.” (quotation omitted).

“A motion to remove for cause is committed to the discretion of the [district] court and [an appellate court] will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion.” (q uotation omitted).

See, e.g. , Davis v. State , , 377 (Minn. 2016) ; Hooper v. State , , 787-88 n.2 (Minn. 2013).

Further, because the State did not urge application of the statutory time bar, its application is not before us. Hooper v. State , , 782 (Minn. 2013) (holding that the state waived application of the statutory time-bar on appeal when it failed to argue it).

Whether to grant a motion to remove a judge for cause falls 4 within the district court’s discretion, and this court will reverse “only for an abuse of that discretion.”

See Fox v. State , n.2 (Minn. 2018); n.2 (Minn. 2013).

Hooper v. State , , 789 (Minn. 2013).

2016) (noting that limitation periods for filing a petition for postconviction relief under Minn. Stat. § 590.01 are not jurisdictional); –81 (Minn. 2013) (holding that the limitation period under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

“A motion to remove for cause is committed to the discretion of the [district] court and this court will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion.” Hooper v. State , (quotation omitted).

Hooper v. State , (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 1923 (1967)).

Minnesota courts recognize the following two exceptions to an otherwise Knaffla- barred claim: “if (1) the defendant presents a novel legal issue or (2) the interests of justice require the court to co nsider the claim.” Hooper v. State , (quotation omitted).

(recognizing that even “fairly old” convictions may establish “a pattern of lawlessness” that negates the effect of time passage); d 775, 785 (Minn. 2013) (stating that “any felony conviction is probative of a witness’s 4 credibility” (quotation omitted) ).

“A motion to remove for cause is committed to the discretion of the [district] court and [we] will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion.” d 775, 790 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted) .