Cited by

See Miles v. State , (“The postconviction court is in the best position to evaluate witness credibility and so we defer to the court’s credibility determinations.”).

8 “The postconviction court is in the best position to evaluate witness credibility.”

(stating that the district court properly rejected a claim of newly discovered evidence because the evidence was substantively inadmissible).

Juring “has the burden on appeal of proving both that the trial court abused its discretion when it 5 made the evidentiary ruling and that [he] was thereby prejudiced.”

This prong requires “examining the admissibility and weight of the evidence at issue and considering it in light of the evidence the [s]tate admitted at trial.” (quotation omitted).

First, “for the statement-against-interest exception to apply, the declarant must be unavailable.” see also Minn. R. Evid.

(requiring deference to credibility determinations).

Because “[t]he postconviction court is in the best position to evaluate witness credibility,” we will not disturb the postconviction court’s findings of fact if “reasonable evidence” supports those findings.

Miles v. State , (M inn.

(stating that “[t]he postconviction court is in the best position to evaluate witness credibility”).

Appellate courts “will not reverse ev identiary rulings absent a clear abuse of discretion.”

See Miles v. State , (“The postconviction court is in the best position to evaluate witness credibility and so we defer to the court’s credibility determinations.”).

See, -04 (Minn. 2013) (petitioner failed to pro ve that hearsay declarant was unavailable or that statement was trustworthy); Tscheu, d at 404 (petitioner failed to prove that newly discovered evidence was credible).

Miles v. State , , 204 (Minn. 2013).

- 04 (Minn. 2013) (stating the proponent of the evidence had burden to establish the declarant was unavailable); see also Peter Thompson, Minnesota Practice, Evidence § 804.01 (4th ed. 2017).

Accordingly, we apply the abuse- of-discretion standard, and White “has the burden on appeal of proving both that the trial court abused its discretion when it made the evidentiary ruling and that the defendant was thereby prejudiced.”

Appellate courts “will not reverse evidentiary rulings absent a clear abuse of discretion.”

is ¡ against logic and the facts in the record.’ ” ().

(stating that “[t]he postconviction court is in the best position to evaluate witness credibility”).

d 195, 204 (Minn. 2013).

7 (“The postconviction court is in the best position to evaluate witness credibility and so we defer to the court’s credibility determinations.”).

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding C.J.’s statement under the statement-against-interest exception to the hearsay rule because Richards has not shown that the statement is “trustworthy by independent corroborating evidence that bespeaks reliability.”

ime bar precludes all of [petitioner]’s claims,” including his ineffective-assistance claim); n.2 (Minn. 2012) (stating that “the timeliness requirements found in section 590.01 apply with equal force to [a] petition” for postconviction relief that asserts a claim for plea withdrawal as to a petition that does not assert such a claim); –01 (Minn. 2013) (distinguishing newly-discovered-evidence exception to two-year time limit for filing postconviction-relief petition from postconviction claim fo

Because “[t]he postconviction court is in the best position to evaluate witness credibility,” we review its credibility determinations under the clearly erroneous standard.

(stating that appellate courts defer to a district court’s credibility determinations).