Cited by

(stating that “the trial court has the responsibility of finding the facts and resolving the conflicts in the evidence”); (reversing and remanding where “findings are missing”).

We review a district court’s factual findings for clear error, questions of law de novo, and the ultimate decision to modify child support for an abuse of discretion

The 2 Casterton presents tax and family law cases to define and illustrate what constitutes a “primary residence.” (“Based upon this common meaning and usage, a child’s ‘primary residence’ is the principal dwelling or place where the child lives.”); (“The most significant factor in determining domicile is the person’s intent to remain in a fixed pla

Minn. Stat. §§ 518.175, .18 (2020)

is sufficient to allow meaningful appellate review.” Suleski v. Rupe

jected this argument and found earlier proceedings had “ made clear that the purpose of the ‘second opinion’ was not to reinvestigate the original claims of abuse but to provide a second opinion o f the child’s 8 readiness to engage in reunification therapy.” Generally, “[w]hether a provision in a dissolution judgment and decree is clear or ambiguous is a legal question.” (quotations and citations omitted).

fter it determined that an award of temporary spousal maintenance should be made permanent so that the district court could consider the parties’ relative financial positions and make the appropriate award) ; (stating that “[i]t is not within the province of [appellate courts] to determine issues of fact on appeal”); d 330, 338 (Minn. App. 2014) (reversing and remanding because “findings are missing”).

“Whether a provision in a dissolution judgment and decree is clear or ambiguous is a legal question.”

Parenting time can be deemed restricted when a modification is “substantial.”

Suleski v. Rupe , (citations omitted).

(providing that a dissolution decree is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning) .

“Appellate courts disfavor the verbatim adoption of a party’s proposed ruling by the district court but do not automatically reverse a district court for doing so.”

Although the legislature has not defined “primary residence,” M.J.H., d at 440; see Minn. Stat. § 518.003 (2018), we have defined it as “the principal dwelling or place where [a] child lives,”

Suleski v. Rupe , (quotations and citations omitted).

“[A] district court has broad discretion to decide parenting -time ques tions” and this court “will not reverse a parenting -time decision unless the district court abused its discretion by misapplying the law or by relying on findings of fact that are not supported by the record.”

We have previously determined that a child’s primary residence is plainly and unambiguously “the principal dwelling or place where the child lives.”

In Suleski v. Rupe , we applied dictionary meanings to conclude that primary residence is “the principal dwelling or place where the child lives.” d 330, 335 (Minn. App. 2014).

d 330, 334 (Minn. App. 2014).

See Suleski v. Rupe , (holding that a district cour t’s interpretation of an ambiguous provision in an order is reviewed for clear error).

d 330, 334 (Minn. App. 2014).

(applying the dictionary definition and common meaning of the term “primary residence” in a family-law dispute where the term was not defined in statute).

D E C I S I O N District courts have “broad discretion to decide parenting-time questions,” and an appellate court “will not reverse a parenting-time decision unless the district court abused its discretion by misapplying the law or by relying on findings of fact that are not supported by the record.”

“On appeal, findings of fact are accepted unless they are clearly erroneous,” and w e defer to the district court’s credibility determinations, Vangsness, d at 472.

We will not reverse a parenting -time decision unless the district court abused its broad discretion “by misapplying the law or by relying on findings of fact that are not supported by the record.”

“[A] district court has broad discretion to decide parenting-time questions.” Suleski v. Rupe , ().

1 “A modification of custody or a change of the child’s primary residence requires that the district court utilize the procedures set forth in Minn. Stat. § 518.18 (d) and associated caselaw.” -35 (Minn.App.

and will not reverse a parenting-time decision unless the district court abused its discretion by misapplying the law or by relying on findings of fact that are not supported by the record.” Suleski v. Rupe , (citation omitted).

7 The crux of the parenting-time issue in this case is the definition of “primary residence.” In Suleski v. Rupe, this court noted that the term “primary residence” is not defined in Minn. Stat. § 518.003 (2012), the definitional section of chapter 518, “or in any other section of the family -law statutes.”

“Whether a provision in a dissolution judgment and decree is clear or ambiguous is a legal question.”

“Appellate courts recognize that a district court has broad disc retion to decide parenting-time questions and will not reverse a parenting-time decision unless the district court abused its discretion by misapplying the law or by relying on findings of fact that are not supported by the record.” Suleski v. Rupe , (citations omitted).

Reversible abuses of discretion include misapplying the law or “relying on findings of fact that are not supported by the record.”

See Kucera v. Kucera, 275 Minn. 252, 254, (stating that “[i]t is not within the province of [appellate courts] to determine issues of fact on appeal”); (reversing and remanding where “findings are missing”).