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5(b); (reinforcing principle that best interests of child control district court’s decision to grant or deny parenting time).

Tarlan, d at 919 ; d 330, 339 (Minn. App. 2014).

“A modification of custody or a change of the child’s primary residence requires that the district court utilize the procedures set forth in Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d) [(2012)] and associated caselaw.” –35 (Minn. App. 2014).

This court will not reverse a parenting-time determination “unless the district court abused its discretion by misapplying the law or by relying on findings of fact that are not supported by the record.”

“Appellate courts recognize that a district court has broad discretion 17 to decide parenting -time questions and will not reverse a parenting -time decision unless the district court abused its discretion by misapplying the law or by relying on findings of fact that are not supported by the record.” (citations omitted).

She acknowledges that the district court made findings on all 12 statutory best-interests factors but argues that its decision is faulty because the district court adopted father’s proposed findings “nearly verbatim.” We “disfavor the verbatim adoption of a party’s proposed ruling by the district court.” d 330, 339 (Minn. App. 2014).

(“This court’s review of a district court’s third-party custody determination is limited to whether the court abused its discretion.”); Suleski v. Rupe , (applying abuse-of-discretion standard to parenting- time decisions).

(considering whether a reduction in parenting time constituted a restriction such that an evidentiary hearing was required).

“To determine whether a reduction in parenting time constitutes a restriction or modification, the court should consider the reasons for the changes as well as the amount of the reduction.” -37 (Minn App. 2014) (quotation omitted).

“A modification of custody or a change of the child’s primary residence requires that the district court utilize the procedures set forth in Minn. Stat. § 518.18(d) and associated caselaw.” –35 (Minn. App. 2014) (addressing Minn. Stat. § 518.18 (2012)).

See, e.g., Ayers, d at 518-20; -36 (Minn. App. 2014).

(parenting-time modification); (child-support modification).

d 330, 339 (Minn. 2014); -59 (Minn. App. 1987).

A “document is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning.” (quotation omitted).

5(c) (2022); (“There is no statutory definition of what constitutes a ‘restriction’ of parenting time.”).

6 “Appellate courts recognize that a district court has broad discretion to decide parenting-time questions, and will not reverse a parenting-time decision unless the district court abused its discretion by misapplying the law or by relying on findings of fact that are not supported by the record.” Suleski v. Rupe , (citations omitted).

“Appellate courts recognize that a district court has broad discretion to decide parenting-time questions and will not reverse a parenting-time decision unless the district court abused its discretion by misapplying the law or by relying on findings of fact that are not supported by the record.” (citations omitted); (“A district court abuses its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the

“There is no statutory definition of what constitutes a ‘restriction’ of parenting time.” .

“‘[P]rimary residence,’ which is not defined by statute, relates to the principal location where the child resides.” (d 330, 335 (Minn. App. 2014)), rev. denied (Minn. May 18, 2021).

“There is no statutory definition of what constitutes a ‘restriction’ of parenting time.”

The term “unnecessary” is commonly understood to mean “needless.” See ; (applying the dictionary definition and common meaning of the term “primary residence” in a family- law dispute where the term was not defined in statute).

Although the legislature has not defined “primary residence,” we have construed “primary residence” to mean “the principal dwelling or place where the child lives.”

Whether section 518.175, subdivision 5(c), applies to a motion to modify parenting time depends on whether the requested modification is characterized as a “restriction.”

We review a district court’s factual findings for clear error, questions of law de novo; and the ultimate decision of whether to modify child support for an abuse of discretion, 2

holiday schedule, the district court considered that the original parenting-time schedule did not allow for vacation over the Christmas holiday but that “[d]espite this, the parties have allowed for vacation time to be taken over the Christmas holiday and have continued conflict over this issue.” In arguing that this determination was an abuse of discretion, father relies on Suleski v. Rupe

On appeal, we will not disturb a parenting- time decision “unless the district court abused its discretion by misapplying the law or by relying on findings of fact that are not supported by the record.”

While a “restriction” of parenting time is not defined by statute, when addressing “whether a reduction in parenting time constitutes a restriction or modification [of parenting time], the court should consider the reasons for the changes as well as the am ount of the reduction.” (quot ation omitted).

(“A district court’s determination of the meaning of an ambiguous judgment and decree provision is a fact question, which appellate courts review for clear error.”).

(“A district court’s determination of the meaning of an ambiguous judgment and decree provision is a fact question, which appellate courts review for clear error.”).

(noting, in the context of a parent whose parental rights had not been terminated, that “[a]ppellate courts recognize that a district court has broad discretion to decide parenting-time questions”).

“ Generally, a document is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning.” Suleski v. Rupe , (quotation omitted).