Cited by

challenges the district court’s findings related to the breach because, it argues, the district court improperly relied on communications from TestResources “sent after the dispute arose to offer compromises.” “We afford the district court broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters, and we will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch

Doe 136 v. Liebsch, (explaining that erroneous exclusion of evidence is not grounds for a new trial if the exclusion was harmless).

“We afford the district court broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters, and we will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch

le 403 when it stated it was “concerned about the jury getting confused and the prejudicial aspect of evidence or testimony related to prior incidents.” “[D]eciding which facts or issues could confuse the jury—and whether that risk of confusion is necessary to the adjudication of the case —is a function that rests soundly within the discretion of the [district] court.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch, n.3 (Minn. 2015).

“We afford the district court broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters, and we will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch

613; Doe 136 v. Liebsch, d 875, 882 (Minn. 2015) .

01(d)(1)(B), which defines certain evidence as “not hearsay” when it is “consistent with the declarant’s testimony and helpful to the trier of fact in evaluating the declarant’s credibility as a witness.” But “[w]e afford the district court broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters, and we will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch

We “afford the district court broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters” and “will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch

7(d) (2020) (providing that an error must affect substantial rights to support reversal); Doe 136 v. Liebsch, (holding that the erroneous exclusion of evidence is not grounds for a new trial when the error is harmless).

See Doe 136 v. Liebsch, (“ An Alford plea is a plea in which an individual accused of a crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence while not admitting guilt.

“We afford the district court broad discret ion when ruling on evidentiary matters, and we will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch

The supreme co urt has stated that “[a] conviction based upon an Alford plea generally carries the same penalties and collateral consequences as a conve ntional guilty plea.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch , (citing Armenakes v. State , 821 A.2d 239, 242 (R.I. 2003), for the 16 proposition that “an Alford plea ‘may be used later for a ny legitimate purpose, including sentencing factors and enhancement’”).

(determining that district court properly received a judgment roll from criminal proceedings in a civil case because a “prior plea of guilty may be admissible against a party to an action as an admission against interest”); with Doe 136 v. Liebsch, (“But we have never stated that a district court must admit a guilty plea as evidence in a subsequent civil matter.”).4 While the parties do not cite them, the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure appear to foreclose using an 4 Peterson relies on an

Again, we “afford the district court broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters, and we will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch

Relator relies 5 on the Minnesota Supreme Court ’s exclusion of an Alford plea from a civil case in Doe 136 v. Liebsch

Doe 136 v. Liebsch, d 875, 882 (Minn. 2015).

Doe 136 v. Liebsch, (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 167 (1970)).

A 1 “An Alford plea is a plea in which an individual accused of a crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence while not admitting guilt.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch , (quotation omitted).

(3) be on probation for 15 years; (4) have a no contact order and a domestic abuse no contact order for his wife and another woman; 1 “An Alford plea is a plea in which an individual accused of a crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence while not admitting guilt.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch , (quotation omitted); see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970).

403,” and “the district court has broad discretion when deciding whether to exclude impeachment evidence under Rule 403.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch, (citations omitted).

See Doe 136 v. Liebsch, - 83 (Minn. 2015) (holding that statements of fact in a complaint may be used “for impeachment purposes” when they contradict later testimony).

Doe 136 v. Liebsch, (Lillehaug, J., dissenting).

(citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970)); see also Doe 136 v. Liebsch

“An Alford plea is an appealing resolution for defendants who, despite maintaining their innocence, have ‘nothing to gain by a trial and much to gain by pleading,’ such as avoiding a harsher sentence.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch, (quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 37, 91 S. Ct. at 167).

“[Appellate courts] afford the district court broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters, and [appellate courts] will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch