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6 “We afford the district court broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters, and we will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that discretion[.]” Doe 136 v. Liebsch

Torchwood Props., (reviewing the denial of a continuance); Doe 136 v. Liebsch, (reviewing the exclusion of evidence).

See Doe 136 v. Liebsch, see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (holding that express admission of guilt is not a constitutional requisite to a valid guilty plea and that an individual “may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilli

will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch

“By their very nature, evidentiary rules demand a case by case analysis, an analysis best left to the [district court] judge familiar with the setting of the case.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch, (quotation omitted).

will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch

3 Nothing in the record supports Spry’s assertion that he entered an Alford plea, in which “‘an individual accused of a crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence’ while not admitting guilt.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch, (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970)).

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37- 38 (1970); see also Doe 136 v. Liebsch, (discussing Minnesota’s formal adoption of Alford pleas).

See Doe 136 v. Liebsch, d 875, 879 (Minn. 2015); Kenney, d at 221.

“We afford the district court broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters, and we will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch

“We afford the district court broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters, and we will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch

would wake up in the middle of the night to Irving 1 “An Alford plea is a plea in which ‘[a]n individual accused of [a] crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence’ while not admitting guilt.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch, (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970)).

A district court is afforded “broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters” and will not be reversed “absent an abuse of that discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch

401- 03; - 88 (Minn. 2014) (affirming district court’s exclusion of testimony refuting an allegation of a violation of an OFP as “irrelevant”); Doe 136 v. Liebsch, (stating “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice” (quotation omitted)).

See Doe 136 v. Liebsch, (discussing the formal adoption of Alford pleas).

See Doe 136 v. Liebsch, (discussing the formal adoption of Alford pleas).

“We afford the district court broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters, and we will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch

“We afford the district court broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters,” Doe 136 v. Liebsch, and we “will not lightly overturn a trial court’s evidentiary ruling.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“We afford the district court broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters, and we will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch

The district court has “broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch

will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch

District courts are afforded “broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch

Minnesota Rule of Evidence 403 states in part that, “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if 16 its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice[.]” Generally, “[e]vidence has probative value when it, in some degree, advances the inquiry.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch, (quotation omitted).

We note also that Minnesota law does not recognize pleas of no contest or “nolo contendere.” See Doe 136 v. Liebsch, n.3 (Minn. 2015) (Lillehaug, J., dissenting); State v. Kiewel, 207 N.W.

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970); see also Doe 136 v. Liebsch, (“An Alford plea is a plea in which an individual accused of a crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence while not admitting guilt.” (quotation omitted)).

“We afford the district court broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters, and we will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch

The district court has “broad discretion” to rule on evidentiary matters, and we generally will not reverse “absent an abuse of that discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch

challenges the district court’s findings related to the breach because, it argues, the district court improperly relied on communications from TestResources “sent after the dispute arose to offer compromises.” “We afford the district court broad discretion when ruling on evidentiary matters, and we will not reverse the district court absent an abuse of that discretion.” Doe 136 v. Liebsch

Doe 136 v. Liebsch, (explaining that erroneous exclusion of evidence is not grounds for a new trial if the exclusion was harmless).