Cited by

“To determine if a jury instruction correctly states the law, [an appellate court] analyze[s] the criminal statute and the case law under it.”

Strobel's argument is similar to the defendant's speedy-trial argument in State v. Taylor

“To determine if a jury instruction correctly states the law, [appellate courts] analyze the criminal statute and the case law under it.”

A district court has “broad discretion” to craft jury instructi ons, and it abuses that discretion if the instructions given “confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law.” State 5 v. Taylor, -15 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).

“To determine if a jury instruction correctly states the law, [this court] analyzes the criminal statute and the case law under it.”

(explaining preference that district courts give limiting instructions sua sponte, but it is not plain error to fail to do s o).

B. Reason for the delay With respect to the second factor, “t he key question is whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for th[e] delay.” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).

Also, if the district court’s erroneous ruling does not implicate a defendant’s right to testify, then the error is harmless “if there is no reasonable possibility that it substantially influence[d] the jury’s decision.” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted); (stating harmless error standard when constitutional right is not implicated).

Rather, they are re lated factors and must be considered together 11 with such other circumstance s as may be relevant.” State v. Taylor , (quotation omitted).

“To determine if a jury instruction correctly states the law, we analyze the criminal statute and the case law under it.”

We will, however, consider an allegation of reversible error if it “ is obvious on mere inspection.” (quoting Louden v. Louden, 221 Minn. 338, 339, ).

d 1, 22 (Minn. 2015) (explaining that fleeing from police can be “suggestive of consciousness of guilt” (quotation omitted)).

(articulating that we review unobjected -to jury instructions for plain error).

State v. Taylor , , 11 (Minn. 2015).

See State v. Taylor , , 22 (Minn. 2015) ("We deem arguments waived on appeal if a pro se supplemental brief contains no argument or citation to legal authority in support of the allegations."

VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6

B. Reason for the delay With respect to the second factor, “the key question is whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for the delay.” (quotation omitted).

(applying harmless- 5 error review to Confrontation Clause errors) (citation omitted); d 578, 621 (Minn. 2004) (applying harmless-erro r review to an “err oneous exclusion of evidence that violates the defe ndant’s right to present eviden ce”).

and Scott, she was taking the fall for him, and they had a scheme or plan.” “An error is harmless if there is no reasonable possibility that it substantially influence[d] the jury’s decision.” State v. Taylor , (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).

However, we disagree with their concession based on our reading of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s as applied to relationship-evidence cases.

State v. Taylor , (hol ding defendant’s substantial rights unaffected where court failed to sua sponte strike improper te stimony but the proper jury instructions corrected any confusion).

“Criminal defendants have the right to a speedy trial under the constitutions of both the United States and Minnesota.” (citing U.S. Const. amend.

(failure to offer sua sponte instruction in the absence of a request was not plain error).

State v. Taylor , (stating that pattern jury instructions are neither precedential nor binding).

A district court has “broad discretion” to craft jury instructions, and it abuses that discretion if the instructions given “confuse, mislead, or materially misstate the law.” -15 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted).

See State v. Palmer , n.1 (Minn. App. 1986) (requiring appellant to provide reviewing court with record sufficient to demonstrate error); (considering and rejecting claim that district court abused its discretion by admitting recording of telephone call defendant made from jail).

State v. Taylor , (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192-93 (1972)).

6 District courts have “broad discretion” to craft a jury instruction, and they abuse that discretion if the instruction given “confuse[s], mislead [s], or materially misstate [s] the law.” (quotation omitted).

(articulating that we review unobjected-to jury instructions for plain error).

see Barker, 407 U.S. 514, 530 –33, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192 –93 (1972).

To satisfy a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must prove “that 4 counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that “there was a r easonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Appellant does not provide argument or citation to legal authority to support his claims, and we therefore decline to consider them unless “prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.” (quotation omitted); State v. Krosch , -20 (Minn. 2002).