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In sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, if an element of the offense is supported by direct evidence, appellate courts examine the record to dete rmine if the evidence is sufficient to permit jurors to reach their verdict when “viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction.” ().

d 24, 39-40 (Minn. 2016).

(implicitly overruling Kirch’s statement that mental states cannot be proved by direct evidence).

An error affects substantial rights if “there is a rea sonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” (quotation omitted).

In cases where direct evidence supports an element of the offense, our review is limited to “a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the convi ction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict that they did.” (quotation omitted).

See State v. Horst , Bernhardt v. State

Also, “an error in admitting evidence, even if it is of constitutional magnitude, is a trial error tha t requires an assessment of prejudice as a precondition to granting relief.” -37 (Minn. 2016).

Here, the state presented direct evidence of Sawina’s determination and intent—all five victims testified that Sawina said, “Get out, I’m going to kill you guys.” (characterizing the defendant’s statement, “I want him dead,” as direct evidence of mens rea); n.4 (Minn. 2007) (explaining that direct evidence is “[e]videnc e that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without i

For appellant to establish that his substantial rights were affected , he must show “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effect on t he jury’s verdict.” (quotation omitted); Reed, d at 583-84.

For appellant to establish that his substantial rights were affected, he must show “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” (quotation omitted) ; Reed, d at 583 -84.

it is the traditional standard, rather than the circumstantia l-evidence standard, that governs.”

Concerning the third prong, the defendant has the burden to establish that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effect on 7 the jury’s verdict.” (quotation omitted ).

” State v. Horst , (quoting State v. Jackson , d 894, 899 (Minn. 2008) (declining to decide whether w itness was accomplice because failure to give an accomplice-corroboration instruction was harmless)).

If all three prongs of the plain-error test are satisfied, we must consider “whether reversal is require d to ensure the fairness and integrity of the judicial process.”

The third prong is satisfied if “there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” (quotation omitted).

Under the plain -error test, “[w]ith respect to the substantial-rights requirement, [the appellant] bears the burden of establishing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” (quotation omitted).

State v. Horst , , 33 (Minn. 2016).

If the appellant satisfies all three prongs of the plain- error test, this court must consider “whether reversal is required to ensure the fairness and integrity of the judicial process.” (citation omitted).

(refusing to decide whether a search warrant was overly broad because “there would be nothing to suppre ss” because the challenged evidence was not admitted at trial).

-40 (Minn. 2016); -61 (Minn. 2015); n.2 (Minn. 2010).

“With respect to the substantial-rights requirement, [the defendant] bears the burden of establishing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a signi ficant effect on the jury’s verdict.” State v. Horst

(noting that the circum stantial-evidence standard do es not apply when the state proves each of the disputed elements through witness testimony on personal observations, and the testimony allows a jury to convict without having to draw inferences).

See State v. Horst , (describing subs tantial-rights prong with resp ect to jury verdict).

it is the traditional standard, rath er than the circumstantial-evidence standard, that governs.”

Salyers, d at 160-61; (stating that when a disputed element is sufficiently proven by dire ct evidence, a direct-evidence standard of review applies ).

Even when a de fendant does not request it, 7 “it is plainly erroneous for a district cour t to fail to give an accomplice-corroboration instruction when the facts warrant it.”

Our supreme Court has “required district courts to instruct juries on accomplice testimony in any criminal case in which it is reasonable to consider any witness against the defendant to' be an 'accomplice.” (quotation omitted).

When sufficiency of the evidence is raised on appeal , we thoroughly review the record “to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the [factfinder] to reach the verdict which [it] did.” ().

See State 9 v. Horst, (noting that when appellate courts are presented with a situation in which bot h standards may conceivably ap ply, the direct evidence standard applies when a disputed element is proved by direct evid ence alone).

“In a criminal case, the remedy for an illegal search or seizure is generally limited to the suppression of illegally obtained evidence.”

To satisfy this prong of the plain-error test, Freeman must show that there is “a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdi ct.” See State v. Horst , (quotation omitted).

she was capable of forming the requisite criminal intent to support a conviction for second-degree assault.” When the sufficiency of evidence is challenged, this court thoroughly reviews the record “to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” ( 5 (Minn. 1989)).

“With respect to the substantial-rights requirement, [the defendant] bears the burden of establishing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” (quotation omitted).