Cited by

The defendant has the burden of showing that there is “a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” (quotation omitted).

“In general, warrantless searches and seizures are unreasonable in the absence of a legally recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Horst , .

-34 (Minn. 2016) (discussing Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013)).

“With respect to the substantial-rights requireme nt, [the defendant] bears the burden of establishing that there is a reasonable likeli hood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” (quotation omitted).

See State v. Horst , 0 (Minn. 2016) (applying an elements - based approach to a sufficiency -of-the-evidence claim in determining whether to apply direct or circumstantial evidence).

“In general, wa rrantless searches and seizures are unreasonable in the absence of a legally recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Horst

State v. Horst , – 40 (Minn. 2016).

And when an element of an offense is supported by direct evidence, as is the case here, our review is limited “ to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.”

it is the traditional standard, rather than the circumstantial -evidence standard, that governs.” State v. Horst

To meet the substantial-rights requirement, “[the defendant] bears the burden of establishing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” (quotation omitted).

But, when a disputed element is sufficiently proven by direct evidence alone, “it is the traditional standard, rather than the circumstantial-evidence standard, that governs.” State v. Horst , (citations omitted).

“In general, warrantless searches and seizures are unreasonable in the absence of a legally recognized exception to the warrant requirement.”

Manypenny bears the burden of demonstrating that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effe ct on the jury’s verdict.” State v. Horst , (quotation omitted).

When the conviction is based on direct evidence, “it is the traditional standard, rather than the circumstantial-evidence standard, that governs.”

It is Coleman’s burden to establish “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had 8 a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” (quotation omitted).

But even if it was error, Cyrus has not met his burden of demonstrating that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” (quotation omitted).

of the accomplice instruction, we examine: (a) “whether the testimony of the accomplice was corroborated by significant evidence, ” (b) “whether the accomplice testified in exchange 7 for leniency, ” (c) “whether the prosecution emphasized the accomplice’s testimony in closing argument,” and (d) “whether the court gave the jury general witness credibility instructions.” (quotation omitted).

In cases where direct evidence supports an element of the offense, our review is limited to “a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.” (quotation omitted).

State v. Horst , (noting that the traditional standard applies “when a disput e d e l e m e n t i s s u f f i c i e n t l y p r o v en by direct evidence alone”).

State v. Horst , (quotation omitted).

In sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, if an element of the offense is supported by direct evidence, we examine th e record to determine if the e vidence is sufficient to 4 permit jurors to reach their verdi ct “when viewed in a light mo st favorable to the conviction.” (quotation omitted).

d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016) (noting defendant’s comment to multiple witnesses, “I want him dead” was direct evidence of mens rea because the jury “did not need to draw any inferences about the purpose of her actions”).

Then, viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, appellate courts ask whether the evidence “was suffici ent to permit the jurors to re ach the verdict which they did.” State v. Horst , (quotation omitted).

Here, Garnett bears the burden of demonstrating that the allege d error affected his substantial rights, meaning that he must show “there is a reaso nable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” (quotation omitted).

See State v. Fields , , 345 (Minn. 2004) ; see generally State v. Horst , , 31 (Minn. 2016) (holding an appellate court reviews factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo when reviewing a district court's decision to deny suppression of defendant's statements to police in the absence of a Miranda warning).

See State v. Horst , (stating that Horst’s statement “I want him dead” is direct evidence of mens rea).

State v. Horst , (“[W]hen a disputed element is sufficiently proven by direct evidence alone, as it is here, it is the traditional standard, rather than the circumstantial - evidence standard, that governs.”).