Cited by

With respect to unity of time and place, we are guided by the principle that, “[a]lthough a crime of possession is a continuing offense, it is complete when the offender takes possession of the prohibited item.” State v. Bakken , (citation omitted).

constitutional provisions against double jeopardy” and “encompasses [an] appellant’s constitutional double jeopardy protections.” (quotation omitted) , aff’d, .

In particular, whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits the State to simultaneously charge a defendant with numerous violations of the same statutory provision depends on the statute’s “unit of prosecution.” Sanabria , 437 U.S. at 69–70 (quoting United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221 (1952) (citation omitted); (same).

“Determining whether multiple offenses are part of a single behavioral incident is not a ‘mechanical’ exercise, but rather requires an examination of all the facts and circumstances.” ().

Thus, the law “prohibits multiple sentences, even concurrent sentences, for two or more offenses that 5 were committed as part of a single behavioral incident.”

This 7 determination “is not a ‘mechanical’ exercise, but rather requires an examination of all the facts and circumstances.” (citation omitted).

“Whether the offenses were part of a single behavioral incident is a mixed question of law and fact, so we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its application of the law to those facts de novo.”

The first step in the process is to determine whether “the words of a statute in their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity.” d 264, 267–68 (Minn. 2016).

“Whether the offenses were part of a 17 single behavioral incident is a mixed question of law and fact, so we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its application of the law to those facts de novo.”

The state has “the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant’s offenses were not part of a single behavioral incident.” State v. Bakken

See State v. Bakken , (discussing provisions of subdivision 4(a) when describing conduct that is criminalized by section 617.247); (same).

Whether “offenses occurred as part of a singl e course of conduct is a mixed question of law and fact.” (quotation omitted).1 When an issue presents a mixed question of law and fact, we will “review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its application of the law to those facts de novo.”

We therefore look to the whole phrase to interpret section 466.07 “to harmonize and give effect to all its parts, presuming that the Legislature intended the entire statute to be effective and certain.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

see Krech, d at 272 (stating that the central issue is “whether the conduct underl ying the multiple offenses was unitary or divisible”) .

If there are two intentional crimes, “we determine whether the crimes were part of a single behavioral incident by consider ing (1) whether the offenses occurred at substantially the same time and place, and (2 ) whether the conduct was motivated by an 5 effort to obtain a single criminal objective.” (citations and quotations omitted).

“The State bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant’s offenses were not part of a single behavioral incident.” State v. Bakken

“The State bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant’s offenses were not part of a single behavioral incident.”

“Whether the offenses were part of a single behavioral incident is a mixe d question of law and fact, so we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its application of the law to those facts de novo.”

“[W]e determine whether the crimes were part of a single behavioral incident by considering (1) whether the offenses occurred at substantially the same time and place, and (2) whether the conduct was motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal objec tive.” (citations and quotations omitted) .

Section 609.035 prohibits multiple sentences for offenses that arise from a “single behavioral incident.”

(“Generally, litigants are bound on appeal by the theory or theories upon which the action was actually tried below, and an appellate court will not consider matters not argued to and considered by the district court.” (citation omitted)), aff’d

offenses were part of a single behavioral incident is a mixed question of law and fact, so we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its application of the law to those facts de novo.”

” d 623, 627 (Minn. 2018) ().

When a district court imposes multiple sentences, “[t]he State bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant’s offenses were not part of a single behavioral incident.”

“Whether the offenses were part of a single behavioral incident is a mixed question of law and fact, so [appellate courts] review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its application of the law to those facts de novo.”

When the offenses at issue are intentional crimes, as they are here, we analyze “(1) whether the offenses occurred at substantially the same time and place, and (2) whether the conduct was motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal objective.” (quotation and citation omitted).

Jones argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his first postconviction petition.

If all offenses at issue are intentional crimes, “we determine whether the crimes were part of a single behavioral incident by considering (1) whether the offenses occurred at substantially the same time and place, and (2) whether the conduct was motivated by an effort to obtain a single 12 criminal objective.” (citations and quotations omitted).

“Thus, the law generally prohibits m ultiple sentences, even concurrent sentences, for two or more offenses that were committed as part of a single behavioral incident.” (quotation omitted).

The fact a defendant committed “multiple crimes over time for the same criminal objective 15 does not mean that he committed those crimes to attain a single criminal objective.”

1 (2018); see also State v. Bakken , aff’d

When the crimes at issue contain an intent element, as is the case here, we 4 determine whether the crimes were part of a single behavioral incident by considering whether they “occurred at substantially the same time and place,” and “whether the conduct was motivated by an effort to obtain a single criminal objective.” 272 (Minn. 2016) (quotations omitted) (concluding district court did not err in sentencing on multiple possession-of-child-pornography convictions).

“Whether the offenses were part of a single behavioral incident i s a mixed question of law and fact, so we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its application of the law to those facts de novo.”

“Whether the offenses were part of a single behavioral incident is a mixed question of law and fact, so we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its application of the law to those facts de novo.” d 264, 270 (Minn. 2016).

State v. Bakken , , 270 (Minn. 2016).

“Whether the offenses were part of a single behavioral incident is a mixed question of law and fact, so [appellate courts] review 11 the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its a pplication of the law to those facts de novo.”

Whether offenses are part of the same behavioral incident is a mixed question of law and fact—appellate courts “review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its application of the law to those facts de novo.”

State v. Bakken , , 267 (Minn. 2016).