Cited by

Thus, the mere fact that the jury had the option to find LaFlex not guilty of first-degree premeditated murder but guilty of second-degree intentional murder—the rationale behind our rule in the failure-to-give-the-heat-of-passion-manslaughter- instruction line of cases, –92 (Minn. 2016)—is insufficient to completely rule out the possibility of harm in this case.

–91 (Minn. 2016) (determining a district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial because the problematic testimony was “one 17 short statement in a lengthy trial that produced over 1,400 pages of transcript,” and “the State’s overall case against [the defendant] was strong”); Bahtuoh, 840 N.

“We review the interpretation and application of the rules of criminal procedure de novo.”

See i d. at 474-75; -91 (Minn. 2016).4 4 Poyirier argues that we should also consider that the “state did not present other, admissible evidence of Poyirier’s alleged prior bad acts regarding C.M.

(citing Dahlin, d at 597).

A district court should not grant a mistrial unless “there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would be different.”

(citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991)) (acknowledging that “the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the denial of counsel is a structural error”); (“Because the district court’s error was not a violation of [the appellant’s] constitutional right to counsel, we conclude that the error in this case does not fall into the very limited class of structural errors that require automatic reversal of a conviction.” (quotation omitted)).

d 579, 584 n.2 (Minn. 2016) (striking information in a brief outside the record).

10 “We review the interpretation and application of the rules of criminal procedure de novo.” State v. Chavez-Nelson

State v. Chavez-Nelson , (“Simply put, there is no constitutional right to advisory counsel.”).

Mistrial Motion An appellate court “review[s] a district court’s decision to deny a mistrial for an abuse of discretion” and should grant such a motion only if “there is a reasonable 9 probability that the outcome of the trial would be different.” (quotation omitted) .

State v. Chavez-Nelson , , 591 (Minn. 2016) ; Cooper v. State , , 194 (Minn. 2008).

d 579, 588 (Minn. 2016).

“[W]e review evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion.” (providing that evidentiary rulings on hearsay statements are viewed for clear abuse of discretion).

“On appeal, the defe ndant bears th e burden of establishing that the district court abused its discretion and that the evidentiary ruling prejudiced the defendant’s substantial rights.”

“[A] mistrial should not be granted unless there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would be different.” (quotation omitted).

On plain-error review, “[a] defendant must show (1) an error, (2) that the error was plain, and (3) that the error impacted the defendant’s substantial rights.”