Cited by

“[A]ttempt is an inchoate crime that must be connected to an uncompleted substantive crime that was attempted.” d 545, 549 (Minn. 2016).

n.3 (Minn. 2016); Minn. R. Civ.

And the two Minnesota Supreme Court cases from which Calmes, d at 644–45, derived the crystallized-expectation-of-finality due- process standard—Humes, d at 317, n.6 (Minn. 2016)—each dealt with subject-matter jurisdiction as a separate question from due process and double jeopardy, applying the crystallized-expectation-of-finality standard only in the latter analysis.

(holding that the plain language of the statute does not authorize a ten -year conditional-release term for attempted third-degree criminal sexual conduct because doing 11 so “would require us to read in additional language .

arguing that in Noggle we held that the “substantial step” element of attempt requires a substantial step toward an uncompleted crime.

To support this argument

4725 v. City of Brainerd , 17 (– 51 (Minn. 2016)).

See State v. Noggle , –51 (Minn. 2016) (holding that the district court was not authorized to impose a term of conditional release for an attempted crime becaus e the conditional-release statute did not include attempted violations of the enumerated statutes that were subject to such a sentence)

(noting that courts may not add words or meaning to a statute).

d 545, 547 (Minn. 2016).

But we cannot add language to a statute; rather, we “must apply the plain language of the statute as written[.]” -51 (Min n. 2016) ; see also Rohmiller v. Hart , (“We cannot add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or inadvertently omitted.”).

–51 (Minn. 2016) (stating that appellate courts “cannot read in additional 5 language [to a statute], but rather must apply the plain language of the statute as written”).

“Interpreting a sentencing statute is a question of law, which we review de novo.”

Cf. State v. Noggle , (recognizing the mandatory nature of the conditional -release statute in criminal -sexual-conduct cases applies).

d 545, 549 (Minn. 2016).

6 (2014), does not authorize the imposition o f a 10–year conditional release term for [a] conviction of attempted third-degree crimi nal sexual conduct.”

sentence modifier , not as a discrete offense ”; and ( 2) “the court’s instruction only applied the intent requirement to the first element —sexual penetration—instead of each element.” Attempt as a sentence modifier In State v. Noggle, the supreme court determined that the “attempt statute and our case law treat an attempt as a crime rather than solely as a procedural sentence modifier.”

See State v. Noggle , (“[O]ur rules of construction forbid adding words or meaning to a statute that are purposely omit ted or inadvertently 7 overlooked.”) (citation omitted).

He based his argument on the supreme court’s -51 (Minn. 2016), which held that attempt crimes under Minnesota Statutes section 609.17 are not subject to the conditional-release statute.

“Interpreting a sentencing statute is a question of law, which we review *351 de novo.” ().

“Interpreting a sentencing statute is a question of law, which we review de novo.”