Cited by

“Antenuptial agreements must be fair, both procedurally and substantively.”

“Antenuptial agreements must be fair, both procedurally and substantively.”

52-53 (Minn. App. 2017) (using the term “dissipation” to describe conduct under section 518.58, subdivision 1a), aff’d on other grounds

(“A statute should ordinarily be read as a whole to harmonize all its parts, and, whenever possible, no word, phrase or sentence should be deemed superfluous, void or insignificant.” (quotation omitted)); see also Minn. Stat. § 654.16 (2024) (“Every law shall be construed, if possible, to give eff

Rzeczkowski maintains that Minnesota Statutes section 519.11 (2022) govern enforceability of the DLMP.

(reasoning that party requesting need-based fees need not deplete “limited capital assets”); (reasoning that requested fees were necessary for good-faith assertion of rights), aff ’d

When examining that validity, we begin with the supreme court’s directive that “[a]ntenuptial agreements must be fair, both procedurally and substantively.”

See, -14 (Minn. App. 1994); -53 (Minn. App. 2017), aff’d

“Antenuptial agreements must be fair, both procedurally and substantively.”

We also read the statute “as a whole to harmonize all its parts, and, whenever possible, no word, phrase or sentence should be deemed superfluous, void or insignificant.” (quotation omitted).

WBL argues that this interpretation is supported by the guidance to read statutes 10 “as a whole to harmonize all its parts, and, whenever possible, no word, phrase or sentence should be deemed superfluous, void or insignificant.”

As to her claimed duress, wife points to no evidence that her lawyer coerced her “by means of threats or other circumstances that destroy[ed] [her] free will and compel[led] her to comply” with her lawyer’s “demand.” d 617, 628 (Minn. 2018) ; (stating “pressure on appellant to reach an agreement on the terms of the dissolution after such a lengthy period of negotiations does not amount to duress”), rev. denied (Minn. Sept.

16 “must be fair, both procedurally and substantively.”7

Contract terms are interpreted “consistent with their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning to give effect to the intention of the parties as it appears from th e context of the entire contract.”

See, (noting that the issue of whether the rent-escrow statute abrogated the common law habitability defense was a matter of ascertaining and effectuating the Legislature’s intent); (stating that determining whether the statute setting forth the procedural requirements for antenuptial agreements meant that the common law rules no longer applied would be analyzed using statutory interpretation tools aimed at “effectuating the intent of the Legislature”).

See Kremer v. Kremer , , 627-29 (Minn. 2018).

“The goal of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature.” Kremer v. Kremer

“The goal of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature.” d 617, 623 (Minn. 2018).

“The goal of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature.”

See generally Kremer v. Kremer , n.9 (Minn. 2018) (denying without prejudice wife’s motion for attorney fees and permitting her to renew the motion properly within the timeframe of rule 139.06).

Kremer v. Kremer , , 623 (Minn. 2018).

Kremer v. Kremer , , 623 (Minn. 2018) ("When the intent of the Legislature is clear from the plain language of the statute, further statutory construction is not necessary."

Husband argues that, because the written agreement here addresses both marital and nonmarital property, Kremer v. Kremer , required the district court to "assess the validity of [it] under common law standards, not the statutory requirements."