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“Even if an objection was made and a district court abused its discretion, [appellate courts] reverse only if the exclusion of evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

This is true even when, as is the case here, Morocho “claims that the exclusion of evidence deprived him of his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” d 688, 694 (Minn. 2017).

In Bland, a self-defense case, we held that, “when self-defense is asserted, evidence of a specific act is admissible only to show that a defendant reasonably feared great bodily harm, provided that the defendant proves that he knew of the specific act at the time of the alleged offense.” (discussing our holding in Bland).

the defendant claims that the exclusion of evidence deprived him of his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”

Appellate courts “review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, even when, as here, the defendant claims that the exclusion of evidence deprived him of his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”

8 Appellate courts “review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, even when, as here, the defendant claims that the exclusion of evidence deprived him of his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”

“We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, even when, as here, the defendant claims that the exclusion of evidence deprived him of his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”

1 (2024) (stating that a defendant “may be convicted of either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both”); (“[E]very lesser degree of murder is an included offense.”).

–97 (Minn. 2017), we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded testimony regarding the victim’s threatening behavior, character, and previous possession of a gun because the excluded evidence covered the same ground as other evidence admitted at trial.

(“We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, even when, as here, the defendant claims that the exclusion of evidence deprived him of his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”).

Appellate courts “reverse only if the exclusion of evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

“We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, even when, as here, the defendant claims that the exclusion of evidence deprived him of his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”

Under this review, appellate courts “may consider the strength of each party’s evidence.”

(“We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, even when, as here, the defendant claims that the exclusion of evidence deprived him of his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”).

Appellate courts “review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for [an] abuse of discretion, even when, as here, the defendant claims that the exclusion of evidence deprived him of his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”

And even if we conclude that a district court abused its discretion in its evidentiary ruling, we will “reverse only if the exclusion of evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

But even if the exclusion of this evidence implicated Cookson’s constitutional right to present a complete defense, this court will only reverse “if the exclusion of evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

And “[e]ven if an objection was made and 12 a district court abused its discretion, [appellate courts] reverse only if the exclusion of evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” d 688, 694 (Minn. 2017).

Finally, Williams contends that his admissions at the guilty-plea hearing provided an insufficient factual basis for third-degree depraved-mind murder because, under the caselaw, such a murder “cannot occur where the defendant’s actions were focused on a specific person.”

1 (2022), a defendant “may be convicted of either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both.” “In Minnesota, every lesser degree of murder is an included offense.” d 120, 125 (Minn. 1975).

to present a complete defense,” we reverse if the district court’s abuse of discretion “was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

If a district court abuses its discretion when excluding evidence offered by the defendant, “we reverse only if the exclusion of evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” d 688, 694 (Minn. 2017).

“[Appellate courts] review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, even when, as here, the defendant claims that the exclusion of evidence deprived him of his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”

the defendant claims that the exclusion of evidence deprived him of his 6 constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”

“[Appellate courts] review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, even when, as here, the defendant claims that the exclusion of evidence deprived him of his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”

The same standard of review applies when “the defendant claims that the exclusion of evidence deprived him of his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”

of abuse to “distract from his own wrongdoing[.]” As noted above, “[w]e review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, even when, as here, the defendant claims that the exclusion of evidence deprived 14 him of his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”

1 (2022), a defendant “may be convicted of either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both.” We have recognized that “every lesser degree of murder is an included offense.”

And we will reverse a district court’s ruling “only if the exclusion of evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”

An appellate court will reverse an evidentiary ruling “only if the exclusion of evidence was not har mless beyond a reasonable doubt.” d 688, 694 (Minn. 2017).

(applying abuse-of- discretion standard to claim that evidentiary ruling deprived appellant of his right to present a complete defense); (applying abuse- of-discretion standard to claim that evidentiary ruling limiting cross-examination violated appel

“[Appellate courts] review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for [an] abuse of discretion, even when, as here, the defendant claims that the exclusion of evidence deprived him of his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” State v. Zumberge