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“When the district court gives improper or inadequate reasons for a downward departure, we may independently examine the record to determine whether alternative grounds support the departure.” State v. Rund , – 33 (Minn. 2017).

(rejecting proposed rule and reversing a downward durational departure in a t erroristic-threats case).

less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the crime in question.” 10 (Minn. 2017) (quotations omitted).

“Substantial and compelling circumst ances for a durational departure are those 3 which demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was significantly more or less serious than that typically involved in the commi ssion of the crime in question.” State v. Rund , (quotations omitted).

(noting that defendant’s “lack of substantial capacity for judgment” was an offender -related reason to depart).

less serious[ly] than [someone] typically involved in the commission of the crime.” d 527, 532 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).

at 623-24; see also State v. Rund , (“Offender-related reasons .

In the durational departure context, “substantial and compelling circumstances” show “that the defendant’s conduct was significantly more o r less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the crime in question.” (quotation omitted).

1; (“[T]he terroristic-threats statute includes more than one mens rea: either the purpose of terrorizing or a reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing.”).

We “review decisions to depart from the sentencing guidelines only for ‘an abuse of discretion.’ ” ().

i. Downward Durational Departure Downward durational departures are jus tified when the offender’s conduct is “significantly less serious than that typically involved in the commission of the offense.” State v. Mattson , see also State v. Rund , (indicati ng that a downward durational departure is justified when offender’s conduct is less serious than typical).

a dispositional departure.” Unlike a dispositional departure, “[d]urational departures may be justified by offense-related reasons only.” State v. Rund

Unlike a dispositional departure, “[d]urational departures ma y be justified by offense-related reasons only.” State v. Rund , .

See Williams v. State , (stating that if reasons given jus tify the departure, the departure will be affirmed); cf. State v. Rund , -36 (Minn. 2017) (independently examining the record to determine if alternative grounds exist to support the departure).

5 D E C I S I O N We afford the district court “great discretion in the imposition of sentences” and we review “decisions to depart from the sentencing guidelines only for an abuse of discretion.” (quotations omitted).

(holding that defendant’s threats to kill police officers were not less serious because they were made with a reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing, as opposed to a purposeful intent to cause terror; the terroristic - threats statute prohibited both purposeful and reckless conduct); State

A district court abuses its discr etion in granting a downward d eparture “when the reasons given are improper or inadequate and the record contain s insufficient evidence to justify the departure.” State v. Rund , (Minn .

See State v. Rund , n.10 (Minn. 2 017) (explaining that, in the typical offense of recklessly threatening a crime of violence, the offender is unl ikely to intend to carry out the threat).

D E C I S I O N A district court is afforded “great discretion in the imposition of sentences.” (quotation omitted).

See, -33 (Minn. 2017) (considering two alternative grounds for a downward departure that were not adopted by the district court).

We afford the district court “great discretion in the imposition of sentences” and we review “decisions to depart from the sentencing guidelines only for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Rund , (quotations omitted).

“A district court abuses its discretion when its reasons for departure are improper or inadequate.”

Additionally, the Minnesota Supreme Court squarely addressed the impact that an intoxicated individual’s mental state has on the mens rea requirement of terroristic threats in State v. Rund , -34 (Minn. 2017).